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SUMMARY
Botnets are a pervasive threat to the Internet and its inhabitants. A botnet is a
collection of infected machines that receive commands from the botmaster, a person,
group or nation- state, to perform malicious actions. Instead of “cleaning” individual
infections, one can sever the method of communication between a botmaster and
her zombies by attempting a botnet takedown, which contains the botnet and its
malicious actions.
Unfortunately, takedowns are currently performed without technical rigor nor are
there automated and independent means to measure success or assist in performing
them. This dissertation focuses on understanding the criminal infrastructure that
enables communication between a botmaster and her zombies in order to measure
attempts at, and to perform, successful takedowns. We show that by interrogating
malware and performing large-scale analysis of passively collected network data, we
can measure if a past botnet takedown was successful and use the same techniques




Botnets are a pervasive threat to the Internet and its inhabitants. A botnet is a
collection of infected machines that receive commands from its botmaster—a person,
group or nation-state—to perform malicious actions. These malicious actions can
range from attacking individuals—stealing usernames, passwords, and credit card
numbers—to those with international, geopolitical consequences, like sabotaging nu-
clear refineries [55]. To better understand these threats, researchers have examined
the command and control (C&C) servers used by botmasters to control their infected
machines, or “zombies.”
C&C servers are hosted on criminal or malicious infrastructure that enable the
botmaster to reach her victims. Malicious infrastructure is comprised of network
assets, such as domain names and IP addresses, that the botmaster uses to relay
messages. Infrastructures can be simple—a single, static IP address—contain a layer
of agility—a set of domains that resolve to a changing set of IPs—or be more agile
still and rely on algorithmically generated domain names or a peer-to-peer overlay
network.
In addition to remediating individual infections the security community has re-
cently turned to performing botnet takedowns, or disabling the C&C servers used by
the attackers to issue commands to their zombies. Remediation of infected end-users
is a difficult and time-consuming process, whereas a botnet takedown has some of the
same benefits and can create a greater impact in a shorter period of time. Specifically,
zombies that cannot reach their botmaster will not participate in further malicious
activities. Unfortunately, takedowns have up to this point largely been driven by
1
manual processes.
Although some earlier takedown attempts have been successful [38, 91], many have
been incomplete due to false negatives during infrastructure enumeration [113, 112],
or caused significant collateral damage due to lack of specificity [112, 62]. This shows
the community needs automated techniques to enumerate malicious infrastructure
with specificity to reduce false negatives and false positives for future takedowns of
DNS-based botnet infrastructure. Furthermore, automation will make it possible to
evaluate previous takedowns’ success, further reduce false positives by identifying
collateral damage, and allow the community to keep pace with agile attackers in the
event a takedown does not succeed.
Historically, takedowns have failed because of false negatives and/or false posi-
tives. In the false negative case, the performers of a takedown fail to comprehensively
identify and take down all the criminal infrastructure used to support the botnet’s
operations. For example, in Microsoft’s takedown of a Zeus botnet [113] many C&C
domains were not deactivated and the zombies could continue their malicious activity.
In the false positive case, benign infrastructure is taken down in addition to the ma-
licious infrastructure, often due to the takedown lacking specificity. For example, the
Bladabindi takedown [62] seized control of 23 domain names, which were the parent
zone for over 5 million fully qualified domain names. Some of these 5 million were
known to be used by Bladabindi, but the takedown affected all domains under the 23
zones. Had the takedown targeted the malicious domains specifically, the 18 million
customers would have likely been less damaged. In some cases, a takedown fails due
to both false negatives and positives, as we show in the 3322.org/Nitol takedown in
Section 5.2.4.
To automatically enumerate infrastructure in preparation for a takedown three
tasks must be performed: malware-based infrastructure enumeration, network-based
infrastructure enumeration, and to identify potential collateral damage. Using the
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output from these tasks, we can evaluate the success of a historic takedown and
recommend actions for a future takedown. Each of these components comprise the
contributions of this dissertation.
1.1 Contributions
Malware Infrastructure Enumeration To perform a proper takedown we must
interrogate the malware to identify any alternative plans they may contain after their
primary infrastructure is disabled. This could be as simple as additional network
assets hardcoded into the malware, to as complex as a completely different infras-
tructure and protocol, for example a domain-name generation algorithm (DGA) or
peer-to-peer (P2P) C&C protocol. Disabling the malware’s primary infrastructure is
clearly insufficient if the malware author has programmed in backup behavior that
has not been taken into account.
We built gza, which interrogates malware to reveal alternative execution plans
of malware and classify instances where the backup behavior is more elaborate, e.g.,
DGA- or P2P-based C&C scheme. gza operates by rewriting network packets in an
RFC compliant way to “play games” with malware and trick it into believing its
primary infrastructure has been disabled. Without coordination, which itself would
use the network and could thus be gamed, the games are indistinguishable from real
takedown actions from the perspective of the executing malware. Furthermore, this
approach is agnostic to the underlying malware analysis platform and easy to extend
to handle other C&C protocols.
gza can coerce hundreds of thousands of likely malicious domain names from mal-
ware that never appeared on public blacklists after our study and that sophisticated
backup C&C techniques, such as DGA or P2P, can be reliably detected by playing
games with malware. Both are necessary to perform a successful takedown. gza
3
is available as open-source software 1 as a module to the popular malware analysis
framework “Cuckoo Sandbox.”
Network Infrastructure Enumeration If only a portion of a botnet’s malicious
infrastructure is taken down, the takedown will not succeed. In fact, some argue
that performing partial takedowns makes the Internet less safe as it trains botnet
operators to design more resilient criminal infrastructure []. The goal is to increase
the understanding of malicious infrastructure by analyzing real-world network data.
We built deck to enumerate malicious infrastructure based on an initial set of seed
domains, i.e., initial knowledge of a set of infrastructure, by analyzing the passive DNS
history of the seed domains. deck builds and visualizes graph representations of ma-
licious infrastructure and analyzes them with respect to performing comprehensive
takedowns using network analysis measures. We show previous work that focuses on
“bad” autonomous systems is unlikely to help combat Internet miscreants as their
malicious infrastructure is typically distributed and that, depending on the network
structure, different takedown approaches can cause more serious harm to the botnet.
We found that in many cases criminal networks can be disabled by de-registering as
few as five domain names. In more sophisticated networks, targeting the C&C servers
themselves can cause substantial damage to the infrastructure. In one case, disabling
20% of a criminal network’s hosts would reduce the overall volume of successful con-
nections by 70%, suggesting that certain “critical” nodes are more important to the
infrastructure.
deck’s visualization of criminal networks has been implemented into the product
offering of Damballa, Inc.
1https://github.com/ynadji/cuckoo/tree/gza
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Measuring & Recommending Takedowns Currently, takedowns are performed
in an ad-hoc manner without oversight nor a method for evaluating success after the
fact. This encourages perfunctory takedowns to drum up positive press and inhibits
the evaluation of techniques that do and do not work, which prevents the security
community from advancing in our fight against criminal activity on the Internet.
Without a reliable process to measure and perform takedowns the community is
doomed to make the same mistakes over and over again.
We built rza—a combination of gza and deck—to measure the success of historic
takedowns and use a similar methodology to recommend how to perform a takedown
and what precautionary measures must be taken to ensure the takedown is successful.
We find that several historic takedowns were performed without fully enumerating
the criminal infrastructure, allowing malicious activity to continue unfettered. We
also show many threats active at the time of the study can be disabled easily by only
“sinkholing” or disabling a handful of domain names. Finally, many of the studied
takedowns caused serious collateral damage to legitimate customers; this motivates
the need to build tools to identify network assets likely shared between benign users
and Internet miscreants to ensure a takedown action does not cause undue harm.
The output of rza for several botnets has been given to the FBI to inform on
the backup behavior of malware and the feasibility of taking down their criminal
infrastructure.
Collateral Damage—Advanced Threats While studying takedowns using rza,
we noticed a common instance of collateral damage occurs when attempting to take-
down advanced persistent threat, or APT, infrastructure. APT infrastructure com-
monly makes use of compromised machines for its criminal infrastructure as it pro-
vides plausible deniability for attacks with potential geopolitical consequences, among
other things. Taking down such dangerous criminal infrastructure is important to
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safeguard enterprises and governments around the world, but cannot be done at the
cost of harming legitimate users.
We present ghost&rae, a system to model “manual APT” infrastructure that
commonly resides on compromised hosts alongside benign domains. After classifying
these domains, we cluster them to separate malicious APT domains from benign
domains to prevent them from being taken down and disabled as collateral damage.
We show that ghost&rae can model APT domains with high true positive and low
false positive rates. While this is only one class of collateral damage to detect, it
represents an interesting case as it is a common source of false positives for existing
reputation systems [4, 14].
ghost&rae is currently being tested for production deployment at Damballa, Inc.
1.2 Dissertation Overview
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 contains the
necessary prior work and background to understand the dissertation’s content, as well
as the datasets and notation used throughout the remaining chapters.
Chapter 3 describes gza, the system to perform malware-level infrastructure enu-
meration. Section 3.1 describes how gza “plays games” with malware during live
execution to trick the sample into believing its primary infrastructure is disabled.
Section 3.2 describes the architecture and implementation of gza in detail. Sec-
tion 3.3 describes the experiments used to evaluate gza and how it can be used to
identify higher level backup behaviors that must be known in order to perform an
effective takedown, while Section 3.4 describes the results of these experiments.
Chapter 4 describes deck, the system to perform network-level infrastructure enu-
meration. Section 4.1 describes how criminal network graphs are constructed to rep-
resent the enumerated infrastructure. Section 4.2 describes the properties of these
graphs in general while Section 4.3 presents four “interesting” criminal networks and
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their properties. Both sections focus on the feasibility of takedown and in the case
studies, simulate the damage done to the infrastructure by revoking domain names
or IP addresses.
Chapter 5 presents rza, which combines gza and deck in order to evaluate past
takedowns and recommend if and how a future takedown should be performed. Sec-
tion 5.1 presents how the two aforementioned systems are used in concert to study
and recommend takedowns. Section 5.2 analyzes three historic takedowns in depth
to determine if they were successful or not. Section 5.3 shows how rza can be used
to identify which botnet infrastructure can be safely disabled through sinkholing or
domain de-registration and which employ more sophisticated forms of command and
control.
In Chapter 6 we introduce ghost&rae, a system to model and cluster APT infras-
tructure and separate malicious domains from the benign domains they share hosting
with. Section 6.1 explains background specific to APT attacks, as well as defining
what is considered an APT in this dissertation. Section 6.2 provides an overview of
ghost&rae with details of the supervised and unsupervised components of the sys-
tem explained in Section 6.3. ghost&rae is evaluated using standard machine learning
techniques in Section 6.4 and interesting case studies of APTs discovered in the wild
are presented in Section 6.5.
Chapter 7 discusses the potential for evading the proposed system given that the
techniques are known to the public and how quickly these techniques can respond to
an attacker with agile infrastructure. Section 7.1 describes potential evasions for each
of the presented systems and the likely costs attackers face when attempting to evade
them. Section 7.2 explains how we can handle an agile attacker. Even if a takedown
brought on by our systems is incomplete, the time to re-run the systems is on the
order of hours; quick enough to place even the fastest attackers back under scrutiny
and the pressure of a looming takedown. Finally, we conclude in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND & PRIOR WORK
In this chapter we describe the background necessary to understand the this disserta-
tion and relevant related work. First, we provide background on the current process
for performing botnet takedowns and describe past successes and failures. Next, we
explain the datasets that are used throughout the dissertation to address the current
limitations in performing and measuring botnet takedowns. We conclude this chapter
with details of the relevant related work.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Botnets and Takedowns
Botnet takedowns are not uncommon, and may take many different forms. Consider-
ing the heterogeneous nature of client machines and the difficulty in keeping individual
machines clean from infection, taking down the botnet C&C is an attractive alterna-
tive. A successful takedown eliminates most external negative impacts of the botnet,
effectively foiling further attacks (e.g., spam, DDoS, etc.) by the infected hosts, which
can number in the millions. In the past, takedowns have been performed by revok-
ing sets of C&C IP addresses from hosting providers, de-peering entire Autonomous
Systems (AS), or, more recently, sinkholing or revoking C&C domains.
Conficker is an Internet worm that infected millions of computers and remains
one of the most nefarious threats seen on the Internet to date [38]. Conficker’s lat-
ter variants employed a DGA that would generate 50,000 pseudo-random domain
names every day to communicate with its C&C server. The takedown of Confiker
required immense coordination across hundreds of countries and top-level domains
(TLDs), and numerous domain registrars and registries. The takedown efforts were
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coordinated by the Conficker Working Group (CWG) [38]. The takedown required
reverse-engineering the malware binaries, and reconstructing the DGA. Then, the
CWG pre-registered all 50,000 domains per day that could potentially be used for
C&C purposes, thus preventing the botmaster from regaining control of the bots. The
success of CWG’s efforts highlight the importance of participation and support from
key governing and regulatory bodies, such as ICANN, and the need of cooperation
between the private sector and governments around the world.
Mariposa, a 600,000-strong botnet of Spanish origin, provides another example of
a takedown operation initiated by a working group that relied on sinkholing known
malicious domains. Interestingly, Mariposa’s botmasters were able to evade a full
takedown by bribing a registrar to return domain control to the malicious opera-
tors [91], underscoring the fact that barriers to successful takedowns are not only
technical ones.
The DNSChanger [177] “click-jacking” botnet was also taken down through a
working group. DNSChanger altered upwards of 300,000 clients’ DNS configurations
to point to rogue DNS resolvers under the control of the attackers. This allowed the
attackers to direct infected hosts to illegitimate websites, often replacing advertise-
ments with their own to generate revenue. DNSChanger had to be taken down by
physically seizing the botnet’s rogue DNS servers. The takedown was accomplished
in late 2011. Largely considered successful, the DNSChanger once again shows the
importance of collaboration when performing comprehensive takedowns.
Not all takedowns are performed at the DNS-level, however, as shown in the take-
downs of McColo [89], AS Troyak [109], and other “bulletproof hosting providers,”
or networks known to willingly support malicious activities. These are extreme cases
where the networks in question essentially hosted only malicious content, and remov-
ing the entire network would disable large swaths of botnets and related malicious
network infrastructure. The effect of these takedowns were indirectly measured by
9
witnessing drops in spam levels, for example, upwards of two-thirds decrease after
McColo’s shutdown [90]. Unfortunately, if a particular botnet relied on the DNS to
perform C&C resolutions into these bulletproof networks, once a new host was pro-
visioned the threat would continue. Sure enough, we saw spam levels rise back to
normal levels as botnets moved to other hosting providers [69].
2.1.2 Datasets
This dissertation relies on large datasets to understand botnet infrastructure and the
malware the botnet’s use, and identify likely sources of collateral damage. On the
network-side, a large passive DNS dataset is used to identify historic relationships
between botnet infrastructure and to create features to model APT infrastructure.
On the system-side, we have a large corpus of malware samples, as well as a database
of domain names and IP addresses a given malware sample communicated with during
its dynamic execution in a malware analysis environment. This is used to identify
malware samples to interrogate, and identify domains that are likely to be used for
malicious purposes.
Passive DNS A passive DNS (pDNS) database stores historic mappings between
domain names and IP addresses based on successful resolutions seen on a live network
over time. pDNS databases allow us to reconstruct the historical structure of DNS-
based infrastructure based on how it was used by clients. Our pDNS is constructed
from real-world DNS resolutions seen in a large North American ISP, as well as multi-
ple enterprise companies. This allows us to identify the related historic domain names
(RHDN) for a given IP, namely all domains that resolved to that IP in the past. Also,
pDNS allows us to find the related historic IP addresses (RHIP) for a given domain
name, i.e., all the IPs to which the domain resolved to in the past. Furthermore,
the RHIP/RHDNs can be limited to domain-to-IP mappings that occurred during a
particular time frame of interest, thus allowing us to focus on the crucial days before
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and after a takedown took place.
To enable our takedown analysis we define the following functions over the pDNS
database:
• RHIP(domain, start date, end date): returns all domains historically related
to the domain argument over the period between the desired start and end dates.
For example, RHIP(foo.com, 2012/01/01, 2012/01/05) would return the set of
all IP addresses foo.com successfully resolved to between January 1st, 2012 and
January 5th, 2012, inclusive.
• RHDN(IP, start date, end date): similarly, RHDN returns all domains his-
torically related to the IP argument over the period between the start and end
dates.
• Volume(domain and/or IP, date): the total successful lookup volume to the
argument domain, IP, or domain and IP tuple on the argument date.
The passive DNS set used in this dissertation began being collected in January
1st, 2011.
Malware Domains We also make use of a separate malware database that contains
malware samples and mappings between a malware sample’s MD5 sum and binary and
the domain names and IP addresses it has queried during dynamic malware analysis.
Each entry in the database is a 5-tuple that includes the MD5 of the malware sample,
the malicious binary, the queried domain name, the resolved IP address, and the date
and time of the analysis. These data are collected from a combination of internal
malware analysis output as well as the output from a commercial malware feed.
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2.2 Previous Work
Relevant prior work is focused in three primary areas: automatic understanding of
malware behavior, understanding malicious infrastructure, and limitations in per-
forming effective APT infrastructure detection.
2.2.1 Understanding Malware Behavior
Deception through gameplay has been discussed [146, 36, 28, 182], or implemented by
hand [30], but little empirical work has been done to demonstrate the usefulness such
an approach provides. Prior work traditionally focuses on improving information gain
generated by honeypots [182, 28] using game theory to model interactions between
an attacker and a honeypot operator. Carroll et al. focus on gains generated by hav-
ing a honeypot masquerade as a normal machine, or vice-versa, and show in which
cases a Nash equilibrium can be reached. Wagener et al. similarly tried to achieve
equilibrium, but also played games with live intruders. The honeypot was crafted to
randomly fail process spawning system calls to coerce an attacker into attempting
workarounds for failing tools, hopefully leading to previously unknown tools and ex-
ploits. Gaming the botnet C&C network redundancy mechanism, what we refer to as
alternative plans, was discussed and used to improve returns generated by a spam-
ming botnet analysis engine [81]. Anticipation games [25], an extension of attack
graphs which are based on game theory, were designed to anticipate malicious inter-
action with a network and determine the answer to questions such as determining the
most effective patching strategy for a given network. We differ from previous game-
play work in that we focus on gathering network intelligence, rather than host-level
information, and we quantify the usefulness of this network information to security
practitioners.
gza is similar, but complementary, to other techniques that attempt to coerce
malware into revealing useful information. All systems that rely on dynamic binary
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analysis run into the problem of code coverage, which researchers have addressed by
forcing execution of all possible branches [115, 185]. Multipath exploration provides a
complete view of possible execution paths of malware but can be evaded with condi-
tional code obfuscation [153] or made impractical due to the exponential explosion in
search space. Sharif et. al. describe malware emulators [151], or malware obfuscated
by a randomized bytecode instruction set, that would evade multipath exploration.
During dynamic analysis, multipath exploration would explore the paths of all pos-
sible bytecode programs rather than the execution paths of the malware itself. Since
network games do not target binary execution paths, we are resistant to this evasion
technique and provide a complementary analysis method. Furthermore, malware in-
creasingly uses external stimuli in the form of trigger-based behaviors to determine
execution. Malware can determine its execution environment [148, 136, 29] prompt-
ing the use of hardware virtualization [45]. More sophisticated techniques include
waiting for a specific date to occur or a particular website to be visited. Research has
shown how to detect changes in malware behavior as well as determine the underlying
cause [10, 23]. We differ from prior work in malware analysis by introducing the con-
cept of evasion-resistant network games. By performing execution path exploration
from the network instead of the host, we make it difficult for malware to detect it is
being gamed or evade our games.
2.2.2 Understanding Malicious Infrastructure
Prior work has focused on identifying autonomous systems (AS) known to host a
disproportionate amount of malicious activity [166, 145, 167]. The idea of network
cleanliness [37] has been explored as a potential indicator for future sources of ma-
liciousness based on the assumption that malicious infrastructures tend to group
together. We show that, in general, most criminal networks span across multiple au-
tonomous systems, which makes knowing the worst ASs a moot point with respect to
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performing a comprehensive takedown. Disconnecting an AS from the Internet is not
an easy task, and it often does not prevent malicious hosting in the long-term [109].
Focusing on high-level network structures, such as autonomous systems, does not
provide sufficient knowledge to perform comprehensive takedowns. In contrast, we
focus on identifying the web of smaller-sized networks that work together to provide
reliable malicious hosting. Criminal networks that span multiple ASs can be dis-
abled or heavily damaged since we identify not only the malicious networks, but their
relationships with others.
On the other end of the spectrum, analysis can be done on individual domains
and IP addresses. For example, prior work has studied the infrastructure used to
support Rogue AV campaigns [41], fast-flux service networks [86], online scam in-
frastructure [87], command and control (C&C) networks [31], C&C migration [1],
drop-zone infrastructure [72], and pay-per install infrastructure [26]. We consider a
campaign to be a collection of domain names and IP addresses that serve a single
malicious purpose and are associated with the same threat type, e.g., botnet C&C,
drop-zones, etc. These studies provide invaluable insight into the low-level structure
of campaigns, but this information also does not suggest how to perform takedowns
effectively. The complex structure of criminal networks makes understanding the
relationships of the hosting networks essential with regards to takedowns.
Graph-based infrastructure work either represents flows between networks or sim-
ply uses the graph abstraction as a way of linking related information. Nagaraja
et. al. [118] used game theory and network analysis to suggest effective attacks and
defenses against networks and network connectivity. BotGrep [119] identifies botnet
communities using random walks to detect dense community structures. Intuitively,
peers in a botnet would communicate with patterns distinct from the less structured
global Internet. Leontiadis et. al. [94] examined flows from redirections to study
the infrastructure used to support illegitimate online prescription drug stores. These
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approaches all make a simplifying assumption, and treat network structure as simple
messaging networks: i.e., two vertices communicating through a connected path in the
graph. Christin et. al. [32] built a graph where vertices are domains, bank accounts,
and phone numbers and edges are drawn when they appear together in a fraud cam-
paign. This link analysis does not follow the typical communication network example,
but still yields fruitful results by providing a concrete structure to group related data.
Our graph building methodology follows the latter approach in spirit, but also makes
use of community finding and network analysis to identify interesting features in the
discovered criminal networks.
2.2.3 Existing APT Infrastructure Detection
Industry and academia have proposed APT detection techniques, but we argue ghost&rae
is the first to do so without also detecting general malicious behavior or relying on
non-generalizable signatures for detection. First, we compare ghost&rae to existing
approaches in industry, followed by comparing against the closest technique discussed
in the academic literature: domain name reputation systems.
Many commercial security products claim to perform APT detection, but most
rely on signatures and many detect behavior common to most, if not all, malware.
Ask et. al. [7] present a literature review of industry techniques that: detect spe-
cific malware used by some APTs and requires identifying static malware network
signatures [120], rely on static network rulesets [13], detect fast-flux that may be
used by APT threats [13], and monitor filesystem changes during malware execu-
tion [176] (a common behavior in most types of malware). These approaches are not
specific to APT [120, 13, 176, 150, 178, 124], rely on signatures and are not general-
izeable beyond the malware samples used [120, 13, 176], detect synthetic APTs [124],
and are presented with no technical details that we can use to compare against
ghost&rae [13, 176, 150, 7]. Of these systems shown, only one provided a total
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of eight domains as indicators all of which ghost&rae successfully detected; they
have been added to our ground truth of over 20 thousand domains.
Domain name reputation systems, such as Notos [4] and EXPOSURE [14] are
unlikely to model manual APT behavior, despite the obvious similarities by modeling
the properties of DNS resolution and lookup behavior. They assume malicious do-
mains “often look randomly generated and share few common characteristics on the
IP infrastructure levels” (zone/network features) and the infrastructure has a history
of malicious activity from both malware samples and public blacklists (evidence fea-
tures). These are not valid assumptions in our case: Section 6.5 show non-random
domains. Furthermore, manual APTs use benign, but most importantly, compro-
mised hosts with many years of benign history. Compromised hosts are the primary




3.1 Playing Games with Malware
Malware uses the same network protocols that benign software uses when performing
malicious activity. Despite the fact that many network protocols exist, nearly all
communication on the Internet follows one of two patterns:
1. A transport layer (e.g., TCP and UDP) connection is made to an IP address
directly, or
2. A DNS query is made for a domain name (e.g., google.com) and a connection
to the returned IP address is made as in #1.
Higher-level protocols leverage these two use cases for nearly all communication. If
we can assume malware relies on these two patterns for contacting its C&C servers
and performing its malicious activities, these are the patterns we must target during
analysis.
We define a network game to be a set of rules that determine when to inject “false
network information” into the communication between a running malware executable
and the Internet. More specifically, false information is a forged network packet.
Consider the running malware sample m in Figure 1(a). Sample m first performs a
DNS query to determine the IP address of its C&C server located at foo.com. The
returned IP address, a.b.c.d, is then used to connect to the C&C and the malware
has successfully “phoned home”. Sample m could also bypass DNS entirely if it were
to hardcode the IP address of its C&C and communicate with it directly, as we see in
Figure 1(c). This gives us two opportunities to play games with sample m as shown in
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Figures 1(b,d): we can say the domain name resolution of foo.com was unsuccessful
(b) or the direct connection to IP address a.b.c.d was unsuccessful (d). At this
point, sample m has four possible courses of action:
1. Retry the same domain name or IP address,
2. Remain dormant to evade dynamic analysis and try again later,
3. Give up, or
4. Try a previously unused domain name or IP address.
In (b) and (d), we see the malware samples taking action #4 and querying a
previously unseen domain name (bar.com) and IP address (e.f.g.c), respectively.
Action #2 is a common problem in dynamic malware analysis systems in general and
is further discussed in Section 7.1.
3.1.1 Notation
Stated more formally, let h be a machine infected with a malware sample m that is
currently executing in our analysis system running game Gname. Gname is a packet
transformation function called name. Given a packet p, Gname(p) represents Gname
gaming p and its value is either the original packet, or some altered packet p′ that
changes the intent of p. The implementation details ofGname determine when to return
p or p′. For example, p could contain the resolved IP address of a queried domain
name d, whereas p′ says d does not exist. In all other ways, such as type of packet and
source and destination IP addresses, p and p′ are identical. As h communicates with
the outside world, it sends question packets, qi, in the form of domain name queries
and requests to initiate a TCP connection and receives response packets, rj, in the
form of domain name resolutions and initiated TCP connections1. False information




























Figure 1: Malware samples m (a-b) and m′ (c-d) initiating a connection with the C&C
server. m connects by first performing a DNS query to determine the IP address of
its C&C server followed by initiating a TCP connection. Sample m′ connects directly
to the C&C using a hard-coded IP address. Examples (a) and (c) connect without
intervention by a game, while (b) and (d) have false information (denoted by boxes)
injected.
is provided to the host h by delivering Gname(rj) in lieu of rj. A sample set for
m, Gname,m represents the set of unique domain names and IP addresses queried by
m while running under Gname. The functions D and I operate on sample sets and
return the subset of unique domain names or the subset of unique IP addresses,
respectively. Given a set of malware sample MD5s, M , a game set, GMname represents
the subset of samples that were “successfully gamed” by Gname. A game is considered
successful if it forces a malware sample to query more network information than
under a run without a game present. We formally define this in the following section.
The described notation is summarized in Table 1 and will be used throughout the
remainder of the paper.
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Table 1: Notation for describing games and the sets they generate.
Gname A game called name.
Gname(p) The result of Gname’s transforma-
tion on packet p.
Gname,m The set of network information i.e.,
unique IP addresses and domain
names contacted, generated when
malware sample m is gamed by
Gname.
GMname The subset of malware samples
from M that were successfully
gamed by Gname.
D(s), I(s) Given a sample set, s, return the
subset of unique domain names or
IP addresses in s, respectively.
3.1.2 Designing Games for Interrogating Malware
Crafting games without a priori knowledge of malware network behavior is difficult.
Furthermore, a successful game for sample m may be unsuccessful for sample m′.
By using generic games “en masse”, we improve our chances of successfully gaming
malware during analysis. We design a suite of games to coerce a given malware sample
into showing its alternative plan during analysis. We apply all games to a malware
sample to improve the likelihood of success. Each game focuses either on DNS or
TCP response packets in an attempt to harvest additional C&C domain names or IP
addresses, respectively. For a DNS response packet pd, p
′
d is a modified response packet
that declares the queried domain name does not exist, i.e., a DNS rcode of NXDOMAIN.
For a TCP response packet pt, p
′
t is a modified response packet that terminates the
3-way TCP handshake, i.e., a TCP-RESET packet. In this paper, we choose to focus
on DNS/TCP packets as they are the predominant protocols used to establish and
sustain C&C communication; however, our approach is general and can be adapted
to other protocols used less commonly in C&C communication. The design of an
individual game is based on anecdotal evidence of how malware samples, in general,
20
communicate. We design seven games to perform our analysis of alternative plan
behavior in malware:
Gnull To provide a baseline to compare the effectiveness of future games, this game
allows response packets to reach its host without modification. In other words, Gnull
is the identity function.
Note that this does not mean malware communication is allowed to run completely
unfettered. We perform standard precautionary measures to prevent malicious ac-
tivity from harming external systems. However, these measures are not considered
part of our network games, but simply good practice when analyzing potentially mali-
cious binaries. We discuss these precautionary measures, which are always performed
irrespective of the active game, in detail in Section 3.2.2.
Gdns1 Malware often immediately connects to its C&C or performs some probing
operation to determine the status of its network before doing so. This game as-
sumes the first domain name lookup corresponds to a test of network availability and
should be allowed to pass through without modification. Subsequent domain name
lookups for domains other than what was queried first will be spoofed. For exam-
ple, if google.com is the first domain queried, all subsequent domains that are not
google.com will be spoofed. We approximate this behavior in the next game using
a whitelist. For a DNS response packet pd, Gdns1(pd) returns pd if its the first DNS
request packet and p′d otherwise. Gdns1 is successful for m iff |Gdns1,m| > |D(Gnull,m)|.
Gdnsw A popular domain name, like google.com, is unlikely to operate as a C&C
server for a botnet. Therefore, DNS queries on popular domain names are unlikely to
be concealing additional malicious network information. For a DNS response packet
pd, Gdnsw(pd) returns pd if the domain being queried is whitelisted and p
′
d otherwise.
Our whitelist is comprised of the top 1000 Alexa domain names [3]. Gdnsw is successful
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for m iff |Gdnsw,m| > |D(Gnull,m)|.
Gtcpw An IP address that resides in a known benign network is also unlikely to
function as a C&C, much like a popular domain name. For a TCP response packet
pt, Gtcpw(pt) returns pt if the IP being queried is whitelisted and p
′
t otherwise. Our
whitelist is the dnswl IP-based whitelist [51]. Gtcpw is successful for m iff |Gtcpw,m| >
|I(Gnull,m)|.
Gtcp1 Malware is often delivered by a dropper, a program that downloads, installs
and runs the actual malicious binary. If we prevent the dropper from downloading
its malicious payload, we will not observe the malicious behavior and fail to unearth
alternative plans. We create a class of games that focus on droppers by allowing
a variable number of TCP streams to successfully complete before forging response
packets. For a TCP response packet pt, Gtcp1(pt) returns pt if the packet is the first
TCP stream and p′t otherwise. Gtcp1 is successful for m iff |Gtcp1,m| > |I(Gnull,m)|.
Gtcp2 Droppers can have multiple stages where malicious payloads are downloaded
in more than one TCP stream. This games two stage droppers. This game is the same
as Gtcp1, but allows two TCP streams to complete. For a TCP response packet pt,
Gtcp2(pt) returns pt if the packet is the first or second TCP stream and p
′
t otherwise.
Gtcp2 is successful for m iff |Gtcp2,m| > |I(Gnull,m)|.
Gtcp3 While one and two stage droppers are fairly common in the wild, we wanted
to test for three stage droppers. We can compare the results for Gtcp1, Gtcp2 and Gtcp3
to determine when we no longer benefit from increasing the number of allowable TCP
streams. This game is the same as Gtcp1, but allows three TCP streams to complete.
For a TCP response packet pt, Gtcp3(pt) returns pt if the packet is the first, second or
third TCP stream and p′t otherwise. Gtcp3 is successful for m iff |Gtcp3,m| > |I(Gnull,m)|.
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3.2 gza
In this section, we describe the architecture of gza and specific implementation details
of our system.
3.2.1 Architecture
gza contains two components: dynamic malware analysis and gameplay. The first
component simply runs malicious code in a fresh virtual machine (VM) and records
all network activity that occurs in the VM. All network activity for a VM is routed
through one of the games described in Section 3.1.2 as seen in Figure 2. While the
malware sample under analysis initiates communication with its C&C, all packets
destined for a VM are routed through a network game. The game decides whether to
faithfully route the response packet, or construct and send a spoofed packet, to the
sample. Games are run on the host machine in isolation from the VMs, so malware
cannot detect that its network activity is being analyzed and modified. As discussed
earlier, all spoofed responses are RFC-compliant packets of the protocol currently
being gamed making them indistinguishable from legitimate responses. As any anal-
ysis technique gains traction, malware authors will begin to attempt to circumvent
it. Therefore, we discuss possible evasion techniques and how to mitigate them in
Section 7.1.
3.2.2 Implementation
gza2 is a collection of Python scripts that run malware samples inside a virtualized
Windows XP instance in kvm and route packets to implement the games described
in Section 3.1.2. All applications and services that could generate DNS or TCP
traffic automatically are disabled to ensure that gamed packets are from the analyzed














Figure 2: An overview of network traffic routing in gza. Multiple virtual machines
(VMi) are run on a host using gza. Each VM is paired up with a game G and a single
sample is run against n+1 games. This includes Gnull to act as a baseline. Each VM’s
network is isolated from all others to prevent local infection. VM network traffic is
routed through its paired game to perform the required packet transformations. There
can be multiple groups of these on a single host to perform bulk sample analysis.
performed to prevent malware from damaging external systems. All SMTP traffic
is redirected to a spam trap to prevent spamming and traffic to local systems is
dropped to prevent local infection of nearby machines or concurrently running VMs.
Each VM has its packets routed through the host running kvm using iptables [121]
with relevant packets being forwarded to a Python script that runs a game. This is
done through the iptables NFQUEUE interface that redirects each packet to a user-
mode process which decides if the packet should be accepted or dropped. If the game
returns the original packet, the NF_ACCEPT message is returned to the host’s kernel
and the packet is routed faithfully. If the game returns a spoofed packet, NF_REJECT
is sent to the host’s kernel and a forged packet is created and sent to the VM using
the packet manipulation library scapy [17].
Games are very short Python scripts that provide two external functions: playgame
and spoof. playgame instructs the host’s kernel to route the original packet or to
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drop it; spoof generates and sends a falsified packet to the VM if the original packet
was dropped. gza allows for additional games to be created and removed as its op-
erator sees fit. The implementation of all six of the DNS and TCP games took only
113 lines of code combined.
3.3 Study Methodology
Using the idea of playing games with malware, we design and run three studies to
understand alternative plans in malware. The first goal of this study is to understand
the prevalence of alternative plans in malware and determine which games are the best
in general; successful games force executing malware to reveal the most additional
information. The second attempts to quantify how useful this previously unknown
information is by determining how long it takes for newly discovered domain names
and IP addresses to appear on publicly available blacklists; coerced network informa-
tion is more useful the longer it takes to appear. The third is to determine if gza
can be used to understand and detect higher level backup behaviors, such as using a
DGA- or P2P-based primary or backup C&C mechanism.
We assume that non-whitelisted network information contacted by malware is
malicious. Note that not all games use the whitelist, but during our evaluation we
ignore additional network information that is whitelisted. For example, ifGdns1 caused
additional benign domains to be queried, it would not be considered successful. For
TCP-based games, we also ignore additional A records returned by DNS requests.
We validate this assumption by providing DNS reputation scores for domain names.
Furthermore, we show how this increase in network information can improve the
accuracy of network-based clustering systems. In both studies presented, all samples
are run for five minutes. We discuss timing based evasion further in Section 7.1, but
in short the issue is common across all dynamic analysis systems and is orthogonal
to the problem we address in this paper.
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3.3.1 Representative Study
We created a dataset, DR, of 2,191 distinct malware samples obtained between April
2010 and October 2010 from a variety of sources, including: low interaction honey-
pots, web crawlers, mail filters and user submissions. We used several sources to
approximate the general malware population as closely as possible. Additionally, all
samples in DR were flagged as malicious by both Symantec and McAfee. For all mal-
ware samples m ∈ DR, we run m in gza against each game described in Section 3.1.2.
The astute reader will notice that we run the risk of uncovering new information by
chance. Consider a malware sample that is analyzed at two distinct times, t and t′
where t < t′. It is possible that the malicious network infrastructure changed at some
time v where t < v < t′, which could taint our results. To eliminate this possibility,
a single sample is run against all games at the same time.
Malware tend to rely on either domain names or IP addresses to communicate
with their C&C. Using this assumption, we can increase the throughput of gza for
the long-term study by only using the two most successful games for each protocol.
3.3.2 Long-term Study
In addition to measuring the prevalence of alternative plans in malware, we want
to determine how useful this information is the day a malware sample appears on a
malware feed. Detecting malicious domain names and IP addresses before they have
appeared in blacklists offers a tangible improvement to companies and researchers
that use domain name and IP address reputation systems, perform network-based
malware clustering, or maintain domain name and IP address blacklists.
Using the two games chosen from the previous study and Gnull, we play games with
malware samples provided by our daily malware feeds over the course of three weeks.
Each day, we analyze all the samples we encounter on our feeds using gza. Samples
that do not generate any network traffic while executing under Gnull are removed
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from our results. For each sample that is successfully gamed, we must evaluate the
usefulness of the newly obtained information. To do this, we cross-reference the
domain name or IP address against eleven public blacklists [40, 99, 48, 50, 102, 163,
97, 43, 133, 140, 132]. The blacklists provide two dates: df , the first day a domain
name or IP address appeared on the blacklist and dl, the last day a domain name or IP
address appeared on the blacklist. For each additional piece of network information,
ni, and the day it was coerced, t, we place it into one of four categories:
1. blacklisted: if ni appears on any of the blacklists after we coerced it on day
t i.e., t < df .
2. decommissioned: if ni appears on any of the blacklists before we coerced it but
has since been decommissioned i.e., df < dl < t.
3. campaigning: if ni appears on any of the blacklists and is currently being used
i.e., df < t < dl.
4. never: if ni does not appear on any of the blacklists.
Each category provides interesting insight into a malware campaign. blacklisted
network information shows our strategy can coerce domains that other parties even-
tually flag as malicious. decommissioned network information shows that while mal-
ware may stop using a network resource, they can quickly and easily resume using
one. campaigning network information are seen in samples that connect to multiple
network resources during normal operation. For example, a sample randomly chooses
which domain name to use to contact its C&C. never network information is perhaps
the most interesting. These are domains and IP addresses queried by malware that
never appear on public blacklists throughout our experiments. blacklisted and
never are the most useful categories of network information and provide the best
improvements to systems that rely on such information.
27
By comparing generated malware sets, we will extract new relationships between
malware originally thought to be unrelated. Consider two malware samples, m1 and
m2 that when run using Gnull they query domains d1 and d2, respectively. However,
when run using Gdnsw, they both query d1 and d2. m1 and m2 are said to be strongly
related in Gdnsw. Strongly related samples have distinct sets of network information
when run in Gnull but identical sets when run in any other game. For example,
consider a malware family that randomly chooses a C&C domain name to connect to
at runtime. MD5 distinct versions of this malware family could have distinct game
sets in Gnull but would have identical game sets in Gdnsw. Strongly related samples
are likely to be related in some way, for example, they could be members of the same
botnet. More formally, two malware samples, m1 and m2, are considered strongly
related in Gi iff:
C(Gi,m1) = C(Gi,m2) and C(Gnull,m1) 6= C(Gnull,m2)
where C is a function that returns either the subset of unique domain names or unique
IP addresses depending on the game type of Gi i.e., C is either D or I from Table 1.
Samples could be related without being strongly related, however, we focus only on
strongly related samples in this paper. Using network games, we can improve malware
clustering that uses network features. Furthermore, we use the existing domain name
reputation system, Notos [5], to validate that our newly discovered domain names are
actually malicious.
3.3.3 Malware Interrogation
In addition to identifying sets of additional domain names or IP addresses revealed
during malware execution with gameplay, we can also identify specific classes of
backup behaviors using interrogation. By running an individual malware sample
under five different execution scenarios, we extract the network endpoints the mal-
ware sample used to “phoned home”, and based on the differences observed during
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executions, we identify likely backup plans.
Behaviorally, most malware when presented with unavailable centralized infras-
tructure resort to one of the following backup plans:
1. The malware simply retries connecting to hardcoded domains and/or IP ad-
dresses.
2. The malware attempts to connect to a finite set of additional domains or addi-
tional IP addresses.
3. The malware attempts to connect to an “infinite” set of domains or IPs. This
occurs when a malware uses a DGA- or P2P-based backup system.
We can isolate and detect these behaviors by running each sample and applying
various packet manipulation scenarios to simulate infrastructure takedown. As a
control, we manipulate none of the packets during execution. To show that a domain
name has been revoked, we run the sample under Gdnsw. We run a sample under this
scenario twice for durations t and 2t. To feign IP address takedowns, we use Gtcpw.
We also run this scenario for durations t and 2t.
Intuitively, if the number of endpoints (domains or IPs) remains consistent across
all runs, the malware sample does not include a contingency plan for C&C failure. If
the number of endpoints is greater when the DNS or TCP rewriting is enabled, but
remains similar between the two runs with different durations, we expect the malware
contains a finite set of additional endpoints as a backup mechanism. However, if we
see many more endpoints in the 2t duration run than in the t run, this suggests the
malware is capable of constantly generating additional candidate domains or IPs to




A summary of the results from the representative study are available in Table 2. Of
the 2,191 samples in our dataset, 17% were successfully gamed by at least one of the
games described in Section 3.1.2. Of the two types of games, DNS-based and TCP-
based, Gdnsw and Gtcpw were successful the most often with 6.0% and 7.5% success
rate, respectively. In most cases, the increase in network information was between one
and three new domain names or IP addresses for alternative plans. A plot of network
information gains is shown in Figure 3. Both graphs are heavily skewed to the right
which shows that if a malware author had the foresight to include an alternative
plan they used few additional network resources. For increases in IP addresses in
Figure 3(a), we see little difference between each individual strategy with respect to
the amount of information increase. Figure 3(b) is similarly structured, but with a
large spike at 14 additional domain names for Gdnsw. DR contained 37 unique samples
of the same malware that all queried the same set of domain names.
In addition to understanding the successes of each game individually, examining
cases where multiple games were successful on an individual sample yield insight into
understanding malware alternative plans. Table 3 shows this overlap by examining
pairwise Jaccard Index [170] of the game sets of each game. The large overlap of
0.93 between GDRdns1 and the more successful G
DR
dnsw show that a naive whitelisting
strategy is sufficient and improves upon hard-coding for common patterns in malware.
Gdnsw generalizes the behavior captured by Gdns1. TCP-based games exhibit a much
smaller overlap, primarily due to the specific staged dropper the game targets i.e.,
Gtcp2 targets two staged droppers. Game performance dropped from Gtcpw to Gtcp1
and Gtcp1 to Gtcp2. This shows that hardcoding for droppers is less effective than a
whitelisting approach.
Furthermore, the small overlap of 0.20 between all DNS-based and TCP-based
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Table 2: Summary of results of the representative study of alternative plans in mal-
ware. The most successful DNS and TCP strategies are highlighted.
Game % Gamed Min Gain Median Gain Max Gain
Gdns1 4.4% 1 2 28
Gdnsw 6.0% 1 3 34
Gtcpw 7.5% 1 2 56
Gtcp1 6.3% 1 1 54
Gtcp2 5.4% 1 1 36
Gtcp3 5.4% 1 1 45
Total 17.3% - - -
Figure 3: Plot of net network information gains for each game.
gamesets, GDRdns and G
DR
tcp shows that malware authors focus primarily on adding re-
liability using additional domain names or IP addresses for their C&C servers, but
rarely both. Since we can approximate our DNS-based games with Gdnsw and Gtcpw
is the best performer among TCP-based games, we will use these two games in our
long-term analysis.
3.4.2 Long-term Study
We ran approximately 4,000 malware samples a day through gza using three games
{Gnull, Gdnsw, Gtcpw} from March 11th to March 31st. In general, nearly all coerced
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Table 3: Overlap in game strategies represented by the Jaccard Index. GDRdns and G
DR
tcp


















dns1 1 0.93 - - - - -
G
DR
dnsw 0.93 1 - - - - -
G
DR
tcpw - - 1 0.50 0.45 0.46 -
G
DR
tcp1 - - 0.50 1 0.36 0.41 -
G
DR
tcp2 - - 0.45 0.36 1 0.43 -
G
DR
tcp3 - - 0.46 0.41 0.43 1 -
G
DR
dns - - - - - - 0.20
network information was never blacklisted (category never) during the course of our
study. See Table 4 for an example of the output for a single day of analysis that
took place on March 15th. Of the unique domains and IP addresses coerced, approx-
imately 96% and 99% never appear on public blacklists by April 2nd, respectively. A
small number were considered blacklisted, decommissioned and campaigning. A
breakdown of these categories for the entire study are shown in Figure 4. As shown
by the plot, almost all coerced network features never appear on public blacklists.
Table 4: Breakdown of coerced unique network information by category and protocol
for March 15th.
Network feature Category Count
Domains Blacklisted 3
Domains Decommissioned 15
Domains In Campaign 10




IP In Campaign 7
IP Never Blacklisted 3381
IP Total 3395
The additional network information generated by our games makes relationships
between malware samples clearer by providing a more complete picture of C&C com-
munication. Consider a graph K where the vertices are malware samples for a given
day of our long-term experiment and edges between vertices represent shared network
information. For example, two malware samples that both connect to a domain name
32
Figure 4: Frequency of network features by category over the course of the entire
study. The top row of figures includes all categories, but due to the domination of
the never category, we also include the other three categories alone on the bottom
row. Please note the change in scale.
d would have an edge drawn between them in K. As we uncover more information
through gameplay, we add additional edges into K. If these additional edges even-
tually form strongly related connections between malware samples, we should see a
decrease in the number of components in graph K. Figure 5 shows that for Gdnsw
we always see a drop in the number of components in the game graph of its network
information compared to the graph under Gnull. Gtcpw exhibited no change in the
graph from Gnull.
We also used Notos [5] to show the usefulness of our information. Given a domain
name, Notos classifies the domain as: suspicious, unknown, or whitelisted. Along
with a classification, Notos also provides a confidence score. Notos was trained using
four weeks of passive DNS data gathered from six ISP-based DNS recursive sensors
located across North America. Notos uses the top 2,000 Alexa 2LD domain names
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Figure 5: Numbers of components for Gdnsw and Gnull for each day of the long-term
experiment.
and the same blacklists used in this study. Of the 161,000 unique domain names
contacted during our long-term study, we ran a simple random sample of 15,050 of
them through Notos and over 76% of them were flagged as suspicious (see Table 5).
The whitelisted domain names were primarily: mail servers, dynamic DNS providers,
and content distribution networks. Notos had high confidence in its classification
of our coerced domain names: 80% of suspicious domains and 98% of whitelisted
domains had confidences above 95%.
Table 5: Domain name classification results and mean confidence values from Notos.
Classification Count Percentage
Suspicious 11,519 76.5%
Not Known 2 < 0.01%
Whitelisted 3,529 23.4%




We interrogated 591 malware samples from 10 malware families shown in Table 6. The
families have known contingency plans with which we can use to tune our heuristic
rules to perform the identification. Of the samples analyzed, 433 had no contingency
3(99% confidence interval ± 0.0010)
4(99% confidence interval ± 0.0009)
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Table 7: Confusion matrix for malware interrogation.
dga finitedomain finiteip none p2p
dga 53 1 0 1 0
finitedomain 0 21 0 1 0
finiteip 0 0 0 0 0
none 4 2 1 426 0
p2p 1 1 1 1 77
plan, 55 used a DGA, 81 used P2P communications, and 22 employed a finite set of
backup domains. None of the analyzed malware used a finite number of additional
IP addresses. Our heuristics successfully classified 97% of the samples’ contingency
plans correctly. A confusion matrix of the results is shown in Table 7.
This shows that with very simple heuristics one can correctly identify backup be-
haviors that may spoil an otherwise perfect takedown. We further describe how these
results will be used to analyze and assist in performing past and future takedowns,




4.1 Goals and Methodology
Our main objective is to identify the components of network infrastructures used to
carry out a variety of criminal activities – such as hosting spam- and phishing-related
sites, deploying botnet command-and-control servers, sending spam emails, etc. – and
to analyze these malicious network infrastructures to better understand how they are
organized and what level of effort would be necessary to take them down. Towards
this end, we perform these steps:
1. Enumerate hosts that participate in malicious activities, and find network rela-
tionships between them.
2. Analyze the structure of these network relationships to identify independent
communities of hosts that constitute distinct criminal networks likely controlled
by separate groups of adversaries.
3. Investigate the criminal network landscape to identify broad commonalities be-
tween classes of criminal networks with respect to remediation strategies.
4. Pinpoint the critical infrastructure within a given criminal network that should
be targeted during coordinated takedown efforts to increase the likelihood of
success, or to maximize the damage to the adversary.
To bootstrap the process of enumerating hosts involved in malicious activities
and find their relationships, we leverage a large passive DNS database [183], which
stores historic records of domain name to IP mappings as observed from live network
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traffic, and a variety of private and public sources of known malicious domains and
IPs (Section 4.1.1). We build an undirected graph where vertices correspond to ma-
licious infrastructure and edges denote a historic relationship between two vertices
based on passive DNS evidence. Finally, we apply an analysis based on commu-
nity finding algorithms to identify distinct criminal networks, and we compute the
eigenvector-centrality of nodes within a criminal network to assess their importance
and qualitatively estimate how much potential damage their takedown may cause to
the entire criminal network (Section 4.1.3).
4.1.1 Data Sources
To enumerate hosts involved in malicious network activities, we leverage a variety of
private and public feeds of domain names and IPs known to have been used for ma-
licious purposes. Since we aim to provide a general picture of criminal networks that
may involve different types of criminal activities, we use several sources of informa-
tion, such as URLs embedded in spam emails, network traces from malware dynamic
analysis, lists of known C&C servers, IP blacklists, etc. For example, given a spam
URL, we extract the related domain name and use a large passive DNS database to
enumerate the set of IP addresses that were recently resolved from this spam-related
domain name. Our passive DNS database is constructed from 16 months worth of
DNS resolutions collected at a major North American ISP spanning seven different
geographical locations and serving several million users.
Our spam feed [77] includes URLs extracted from spam emails captured by a
large spam trap. The malware-related data sources are from eleven public black-
lists [39, 100, 47, 49, 101, 162, 103, 172, 161, 12, 155] and one commercial malware
dynamic analysis feed. The source of information related to C&C servers is an inter-
nal company feed comprising domain names and IPs related to known C&C network
infrastructures.
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To find the network relationships between the enumerated hosts, we leverage two
functions that can be defined over passive DNS data:
• Related historic IPs (RHIP): given a domain name or set of domain names d,
RHIP(d) returns the set of routable IP addresses that d has resolved to at some
point in the past.
• Related historic domains (RHDN): given an IP address or a set of IP addresses
ip, RHDN(ip) returns the set of domain names that have resolved to ip at some
point in their history.
Essentially, we consider two hosts to be related if they can be linked via the RHIP
and RHDN functions.
After constructing the criminal network graphs, we leverage a commercial threat
categorization and attribution process to identify specific criminal operators and mal-
ware families that are known to be affiliated with the identified malicious network
infrastructures.
4.1.2 Constructing Criminal Network Graphs
In this section, we describe the procedure we use to build our criminal network graphs,
which we represent using undirected weighted graphs.
An undirected graph G is defined by its sets of vertices V and edges E. Edges are
bi-directional and are assigned a weight between [0, 1] that expresses the “strength”
of the relationship between its endpoints. A graph is complete if all pairs of vertices
are adjacent, and is connected if for all pairs of vertices vi, vj ∈ V there exists a
sequence of adjacent vertices connecting vi and vj. A disconnected graph is made
up of multiple components, or subgraphs of G. If a component contains only one
vertex, it is called an isolated component [184]. A vertex represents a collection of
256 IP-addresses (a Class C network or /24) and an edge connecting two vertices
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denotes a historic relationship, according to passive DNS data, between two IPs in
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Figure 6: Overview of process to generate criminal network graphs. Data sources are
polled (1), domains are converted to IPs (2) and edges are drawn based on overlaps
found in the passive DNS database (3). Different source type graphs are composed
(4). Graphs are built and composed every day and community finding is performed
to identify criminal networks (5).
A high level overview of the criminal network graph generation procedure is shown
in Figure 6. Every day, the data sources are polled for new blacklisted network data
(1). This network data comes in the form of known malicious IP addresses and domain
names. Attackers are known to quickly migrate to new networks after takedowns [109],
so in a deployed implementation we keep up with this drift by constantly adding newly
discovered malicious network data. All malicious domain names are converted into
IP addresses by looking up their related historic IP addresses (RHIP), and all of the
IP addresses are binned into the Class C networks (2) that they belond to. Next,
we look up each IP addresses’ related historic domain names (RHDN) and edges are
drawn between vertices when the intersection of their RHDN’s is non-empty (3). If
network hosts are found to be related to whitelisted domains, these IPs are removed
to reduce the occurrences of non-malicious infrastructure in our graphs. Graphs from
different sources are composed and edges are redrawn (4). Edges are weighted using
the Jaccard index J , a ratio of the cardinalities of the intersection and union of two







where D(v) is the set of domains that historically point to IP addresses in vertex
v. Graphs from multiple days are composed and community finding is used to identify
criminal networks (5).
4.1.2.1 Whitelisting
Our whitelist contains the top 10,000 Alexa domain names and domains of several
popular content delivery and advertisement networks. The whitelisting process works
by examining the domain name sets generated by RHDN for every IP. Consider an
IP ip, if its RHDN(ip) contains a domain that is whitelisted, or is a sub-domain of a
whitelisted domain, we remove ip from our graph. For example, consider the domain
name doubleclick.net which is used by Google’s doubleclick advertising service.
The top 10,000 Alexa does not contain doubleclick.net (only doubleclick.com), how-
ever, the IP that doubleclick.net resolves to, 216.73.93.8, has an RHDN set that
contains doubleclick.com, which is whitelisted and the IP address 216.73.93.8 would
be removed from our graph. If an attacker is aware of our whitelisting strategy there
is little room for abuse. For an attacker to abuse our whitelisting strategy to evade
our analysis, they would have to commandeer and point a whitelisted domain to their
malicious infrastructure.
It is important to stress that we are seeking relationships between IPs as seen
from the DNS, not from malware samples. For example, a given malware sample
may intersperse its connection to its C&C server with spurious lookups to benign
domains, these networks will not be connected unless there is an explicit relationship
according to our passive DNS database.
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4.1.2.2 Community Finding
False positives can still be introduced, despite our whitelisting, which may cause edges
to be drawn unnecessarily. For example, if a network host sinkholes multiple domains
belonging to distinct criminal networks, our graph building process will erroneously
show them as related. To address this problem in general, we leverage graph structure
to identify the criminal networks using community finding algorithms.
The community finding process can automatically infer these scenarios based on
the graph structure and correctly partition the underlying criminal networks. To
perform community finding, we use the Louvain method [18], an algorithm known to
scale well to graphs with hundreds of millions of vertices and billions of edges. We
apply the community finding algorithm to each non-isolated component in our graph
at step 5 of Figure 6.
4.1.3 Graph Analysis
Definitions: Understanding whether a graph is dense or sparse is a useful measure





and is the ratio of edges present in G to the number of possible edges in
G. A graph with a density of 1 is complete and with a density of 0 has no edges. In
our graphs, vertices are not of uniform importance, so quantifying the centrality of
a vertex in a graph is a useful way of estimating the node’s relative importance in
the graph based on its structure. The eigenvector centrality (EC) is a measure of a
vertex’s centrality which often reflects its importance based on the graph’s structure.
Using EC, a vertex is considered important if it has many neighbors, a few important
neighbors, or both. More formally, the eigenvector centrality xi for a vertex i in a








where A is the adjacency matrix of G, κ1 is its largest eigenvalue, 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1,
and xj are i’s neighbors eigenvector centralities [123]. The EC is a useful metric for
identifying “important” vertices in a graph independent of the underlying data being
represented. We will use this to help determine a takedown strategy that attempts
to maximize damage to a criminal network. Removing important vertices targets
portions of the criminal network that are used both frequently and collectively to
host the operations of multiple criminals.
Consider a social network, such as Facebook, where a vertex represents an indi-
vidual and an edge drawn between two vertices represents a friendship. Vertices in
this graph with high eigenvector centrality will be individuals with a large number
of friends, a few friends that have many friends, or both. Similarly, high eigenvector
centrality vertices in a criminal network graph are hosting providers that provide re-
dundancy for many smaller hosting providers, a few larger hosting providers, or both.
As an example, consider that a botnet operator could host her C&C server using a
benign hosting provider, but when the C&C server is discovered, the diligent hosting
provider will likely respond to abuse complaints and disable it. Thus, our operator
uses a less scrupulous hosting provider to provide redundancy in the event of such a
remediation attempt. One can imagine this behavior occurring in several criminals,
and aggregated over time one would expect some kind of structure to emerge where
the least scrupulous and most diligent hosting providers have the highest and low-
est eigenvector centralities, respectively. This intuition suggests that targeting more
structurally important vertices can help make takedown attempts more damaging to
criminal networks.
There is an important caveat in the social network analogy that concerns con-
nectivity. In a social network, removing social ties can sever friendships between
individuals, but the same is not true in criminal networks. This is because nothing
flows between connections in a criminal network in a literal sense, like friendship flows
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between mutual friendships. The assumption that does hold true is that someone with
high social standing is likely to befriend additional high status individuals or several
individuals en masse. Considering criminal networks, this means high eigenvector
centrality networks are more likely to continue and expand their malicious activity
into the future and therefore are where remediation efforts ought to be focused.
Simulating Takedowns Our ultimate goal is to determine how to perform effective
and damaging takedowns of criminal networks. We first provide a bird’s eye view
of the criminal network landscape to search for recurring graph structures that are
susceptible to takedowns. In other words, graph structures that lend themselves to
comprehensive takedowns that require marginal effort. Next, we focus on specific
cases of large criminal networks where we identify critical infrastructure to target
during remediation to maximize the damage inflicted on a criminal network when a
comprehensive takedown is prohibitively expensive.
Using the graph analysis measures we defined above, we identify potential weak
points in a criminal network graph that may be susceptible to takedowns, and analyze
how successful our takedowns would be by estimating the potential loss in future
successful lookups. Not all criminal networks have the same structure, and some
structures may be more or less amenable to different types of takedowns, such as
taking down specific subnetworks or remediating groups of domain names affiliated
with the network.
We consider the two main methods for takedown: network-level takedown, ac-
complished by raiding a hosting facility, or a domain-level takedown, accomplished
by “revoking” domain names associated with the criminal network in cooperation
with the domain names registrars. The goal of these takedown methods is to prevent
potential victims from reaching key parts of the criminal network infrastructure.
To determine the order in which to take down infrastructure for a given criminal
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network G, we define the criticality of the vertices v ∈ G by:
crit(v) = vip × vd × vec (3)
where vip is the number of malicious IPs within vertex v, vd is the number of mali-
cious domains that have pointed into v, and vec is the vertex’s eigenvector centrality.
The first two measures quantify the vertex’s historic career of maliciousness and the
eigenvector centrality quantifies the vertex’s structural importance to the criminal
network.
Input: MD: a set of known malicious domains
Output: Returns, for each criminal network, the suggested order of networks
to eliminate for performing a comprehensive takedown
MIP ← RHIP(MD)
MNet ← bin IPs in MIP into Class C networks
MNet ← ∀v∈MNet remove v if RHDN(MNet)∩ whitelist 6= ∅
E ← {}
for v1, v2 ∈MNet do
if RHDN(v1) ∩ RHDN(v2) 6= ∅ then






for subgraph ∈ CriminalNetworks do
takedowns ← takedowns ∪ sort descending by arg maxv∈subgraph crit(v)
end
return takedowns
Algorithm 1: High-level overview of how criminal networks are discovered and
nodes are prioritized for takedown.
In an operational environment, takedowns would be performed based on the out-
put of Algorithm 1. The system takes sets of known malicious domains and outputs,
for each identified criminal network, the nodes that should be targeted during a
comprehensive takedown to maximize damage to the hosting infrastructure. The
infrastructure used by the malicious domains are identified using the passive DNS
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database call to RHIP. These IPs are pruned using our whitelisting procedure and
are grouped into their parent Class C (/24) networks. For each pair of networks, we
identify domain name overlaps using the RHDN function. This identifies networks
that share the burden of providing malicious infrastucture and if a takedown were
desired, must be taken down simultaneously to perform a comprehensive takedown.
The graph is partitioned using the described community finding algorithm to identify
distinct criminal networks and by analyzing the graph structure we can determine
which networks provide essential redundant hosting for criminal activity. Because
malicious activity is so heavily distributed, targeting the worst individual hosting
facility is insufficient. To perform comprehensive takedowns, one must consider the
criminal network structure holistically, which motivates the use of the graph-based
representation. It allows us to focus on the entire structure such that we can maximize
the damage against the network.
For every criminal network in our case study, we order the vertices by their criti-
cality using Equation 3 and estimate the benefit in taking down the criminal network
using either network-level or domain-level takedowns. For each type of takedown, we
present a cumulative distribution function (CDF) showing the proportion of domain
names or networks removed from the criminal network against the total amount of
potential victim lookups with respect to the entire criminal network. The intuition is
that revoking domain names and blocking IP addresses that received a large volume
of queries in the recent past has the potential of preventing a large fraction of the
victim population from reaching the criminal network hosts in the future. If we suc-
cessfully targeted critical infrastructure, the CDF will be superlinear denoting that
eliminating key pieces of infrastructure severely impacts the lookups destined for the
criminal network. If a strategy is unsuccessful, we should see linear/sublinear CDFs.
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4.2 Threat Landscape
In this section, we present general observations about the graphs we built for our
study. We discuss source type distributions and describe a case of a frequently oc-
curring graph structure that could be easily taken down.
4.2.1 General Graph Statistics
Starting in May 2011, we began building graphs every day for a period of 8 months.
Our final graph contains 64,030 vertices and 1,957,614 edges and represents 127,597
malicious IPs and 3,018,077 malicious domain names. The graph is disconnected,
where 54% of the vertices are isolated components. These are threats that do not
distribute their infrastructure using the DNS. As we mentioned earlier, many of these
isolated components may also be due to false positives from non-distributed hosting
not present in our whitelist. Figure 7a shows a breakdown of threat types between
isolated and non-isolated components. Most isolated vertices hosted spam sites or
malware-related threats, and very few hosted any others. Our malware and spam
sources are fundamentally noisy which, could explain the large difference between the
isolated and non-isolated type distributions.
Since we are building our graphs with historical data, it is possible that originally
bad IPs are remediated and used later on for legitimate purposes. If the new domains
that resolve to the remediated IP space are whitelisted they will be removed from
the graph, but if they are not they would still be flagged as malicious. To address
this problem in future work, a shorter window of analysis can be used to reduce the
likelihood of this behavior becoming commonplace.
4.2.2 Criminal Network Landscape
The remaining vertices form 4,504 distinct communities where each represents a crim-
inal network. Of the 4,504 criminal networks identified, approximately 87% of them
formed complete subgraphs. In addition to being complete, Figure 7b shows that
46
(a) Type breakdown-isolated vs. non-
isolated. The y-axis represents the threat
type seen in each vertex of our graph. Most
host a single threat type (e.g., spam or
malware), but many host multiple threat
types, even reusing the same IP address
(e.g., malware,spam, etc.).
(b) Log-scale distribution of the criminal
network size, domains and 2LDs in com-
plete criminal networks.
Figure 7: Threat landscape breakdown
most criminal networks contain few domains and second-level domains (2LD) and
even fewer networks. In over half of the complete cases, a criminal network could be
disabled by de-registering as few as five domain names or three 2LDs. This strongly
suggests that a large number of small criminal networks can be easily remediated.
4.3 Case Studies
We describe four case studies of large and structurally interesting criminal networks
that represent the different classes of infrastructure we saw in the wild. The case
studies were not chosen automatically, but were chosen based on the visualizations
of the output of our community finding algorithm described in Section 4.1.2.2. We
used simple graph metrics to select the case student criminal networks by focusing
on large graphs (e.g. many vertices) that had high and low graph densities. In all AS
graph visualizations, vertex color encodes the autonomous system number while the
vertex size encodes the number of known malicious domains that historically pointed
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into the network. Furthermore, the edges are drawn when one or more domains are
shared between two vertices, unless otherwise specified. In all eigenvector centrality
(EC) graph visualizations, vertex shade encodes the eigenvector centrality (darker is
more important), and vertex size and edges are defined as they are for AS graphs,
unless otherwise specified. The authors suggest that visualizations of the case studies
be viewed in a PDF viewer if a high-resolution color printer is not available to get a
clear view of the infrastructure.
For each criminal network presented, we provide a breakdown of the identified
criminal operators using them as well as a breakdown of the sources polled to generate
the vertices in the criminal network. Prior to investigating each case study, we were
unaware of the underlying criminal affiliations. We will see that EC is a key factor we
can use to dynamically obtain a metric for the critical vertices in the criminal network.
As we noted in Section 4.1.3, EC is analogous to PageRank [21] for undirected graphs
and provides a similar measure of the importance of a vertex in a graph.
4.3.1 Rustock Criminal Network
Rustock criminal network was among the largest criminal networks we identified
with 3,177 vertices and 7,128 edges. Rustock [108] was a large spam-oriented botnet
generally used for fraudulent pharmaceutical sales. We describe the malicious hosting
infrastructure used by Rustock and that was still in use during our study by other
criminals.
Rustock criminal network’s most distinguishing features can be seen in Figure 8a.
It is sparse (graph density of 0.001) and the graph contains a dense core of networks
that contain a large proportion of the domain names compared to the remaining
vertices, shown by their larger size. In addition to the number of malicious domains
they host, these vertices are also considered important based on their eigenvector
centrality, shown in Figure 8b.
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(a) Rustock criminal network AS graph (b) Rustock criminal network EC graph
(c) MojoHost benign hosting net-
work AS graph
(d) MojoHost benign hosting net-
work EC graph
Figure 8: Case Study Visualizations [11]
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(a) Masterhost criminal network AS
graph
(b) Masterhost criminal network EC
graph
(c) Botnet criminal network
AS graph
(d) Botnet criminal net-
work Inverted EC graph
Figure 9: Case Study Visualizations cont.
Table 8: Top 10 ASes in Rustock criminal network by eigenvector centrality
AS# AS Description # of Domains
33626 Oversee 14,262
22489 Castle Access Inc. 124,321
15146 Cable Bahamas 55,465
13335 CloudFlare Inc. 21,770
16509 Amazon 6,772
32421 Black Lotus Communications 9,070
32592 Hunt Brothers 14,373
21844 The Planet 12,511
26496 GoDaddy 45,654











Figure 10: Network-level takedown CDFs
The top ASs by eigenvector centrality in the Rustock criminal network are shown
in Table 8. This criminal network employs a mixture of bulletproof hosting, cloud-
based hosting and compromised home user machines as part of its infrastructure. The
inclusion of GoDaddy is due to parking sites the malicious domains pointed to before
and/or after their malicious lifetime. CloudFlare is currently running sinkholes for
Kelihos and most likely for other botnets as well, which would explain its high im-
portance in this criminal network. Castle Access Inc. and Cable Bahamas are known
to be used for domain parking monetization, which would explain their presence.
Rustock was taken down in March of 2011 (Operation b107), however the Rustock
criminal network has facilitated other criminal operations until this day. This shows
that single botnet takedown approaches can solve only the short term problem of a
threat (i.e., spamming activity facilitated by Rustock botnet). In the case of Rustock
criminal network, we saw that Internet abuse continued to use the same criminal
infrastructure, as the Rustock botnet used to use, long after the botnet was taken
off-line. During the 8 months of our experiment, we observed 4,381 new malicious
domain names per day that began to use this criminal network.
4.3.2 MojoHost Benign Hosting Network
The MojoHost benign hosting network (Figure 8c) is an example of a benign hosting
provider being abused by Internet miscreants for criminal infrastructure. We want to
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make the distinction clear that we are not saying MojoHost is complicit in criminal
activity, but rather, malicious threats abuse MojoHost to build their criminal net-
work. It is a smaller community of 255 vertices that has several distinct campaigns,
the “orbiting” sub-communities, using it as infrastructure. The most structurally
significant vertices are colored by their eigenvector centrality (Figure 8d). These 12
black vertices all belong to a single AS (AS27589) which provides redundancy for the
malicious campaigns.
We identified seven distinct operators using the MojoHost benign hosting net-
work for their malicious infrastructure, primarily to act as C&C servers. There were
three distinct Zeus kit campaigns, two Blackhole exploit kit campaigns, and three
unidentified malware family campaigns running C&C servers. In addition to C&C
servers, the community was also home to three data exfiltration drop sites used by a
mixture of Zeus instances. The Blackhole exploit kits facilitated drive-by downloads
that infected victims with a Delf malware family instance, which is used to perform
the second-stage of a two-stage binary drop. Most domains were registered through
dynamic DNS providers which are commonly used in Blackhole exploit kit instances.
Despite the fact that the MojoHost community is benign, it presents an interesting
hierarchical structure that would intuitively be fairly resistant against AS-level take
downs. While the main support structure for the campaigns exists in a single AS,
the orbiting communities are spread across 58 ASs in total. If a criminal network
contained several layers in this hierarchical fashion, it would be difficult to cripple it
quickly due to the redundancy. Maintaining this level of structure may prove to be
difficult in scale, which may explain why criminal networks seen in practice are much
less organized (Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.4).
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4.3.3 Botnet Criminal Network
This criminal network is a large botnet that provides fast flux services across 1,226
vertices, most of which belong to consumer dynamic IP address space. The graph is
almost complete with a graph density of 0.956 (see Figure 9c). It is in the botnet
operator’s best interest to keep this structure as it maximizes the redundancy of the
vertices using DNS agility. Since the graph is nearly complete, it is reasonable to
assume that most of the vertices are of about equal importance. The eigenvector
centrality, however, reveals interesting underlying structure by highlighting the ver-
tices considered less important to the overall criminal network. In Figure 9d, we see
the eigenvector centrality graph where the vertex shading is inverted (darker is less
important in this case), which highlights 32 vertices within the botnet’s sub-structure
that are used for other purposes. Specifically, these vertices with lower than normal
EC appears to be C&C servers and data exfiltration drop sites for Zeus v2 (a.k.a.
Zeus Group B) and Blackhole kit generated malware for a single operator. In this
case it is important to note that the only way to truly disable the network is to tar-
get the central nodes. Eliminating lower centrality nodes would quickly disable the
smaller campaigns contained within, but would not cause damage to the larger crim-
inal network, which is the focus of this paper. Furthermore, significant portion of the
domain names in this botnet are related with FakeAV/RogeAV type of threats. One
of the main differences of the FakeAV threats facilitated by this criminal network is
that they are primarily delivered by search engine optimization poisoning techniques.
Botnet criminal networks are likely to present themselves as dense or complete
graphs with a relatively uniform eigenvector centrality distribution due to the funda-
mental nature of how they are operated by criminals. Furthermore, by looking for
vertices that are considered less important by centrality measures, we may identify











Figure 11: Domain-level takedown CDFs
Table 9: Top 10 ASes in Masterhost criminal network by number of malicious domains
AS# AS Description # of Domains
25532 Masterhost 12,281
21788 Network Operations Center Inc. 3,692
3561 Savvis 3,285
7303 Telecom Argentina 2,830
32613 iWeb Technologies 2,684
21740 eNom, Inc. 2,292
25847 ServInt 2,275
16509 Amazon Inc. 2,254
7788 Magma Communications Ltd. 2,225
6939 Hurricane Electric, Inc. 2,201
4.3.4 Masterhost Criminal Network
At 3,725 vertices and 11,519 edges, the Masterhost criminal network is the largest
criminal network we identified during our study (Figure 9a). Much like the Rus-
tock criminal network, the Masterhost criminal network is very sparse (graph density
of 0.002), but the densely malicious networks are missing from the center. In this
criminal network, dense vertices are not considered structurally important as shown
by Figure 9b. This means that the malicious domains contained within these dense
structures are not heavily replicated throughout the criminal network, making these
good candidates for AS-level takedowns.
The top 10 ASes by number of hosted malicious domains in the Masterhost crim-
inal network are shown in Table 9. Notice the number of domains per AS is sub-
stantially smaller than it was for the Rustock criminal network due to the lack of
centralized malicious hosting. The biggest AS, with the respect of the domain names
that facilitate resolutions for, is the “Masterhost”. Masterhost is a very well known
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bulletproof network that has been identified by the security community since 2007
and it is highly related with the Russian Business Network organization [46]. In the
8 months of our experiments, we observed a median of 1,065 new malicious domain
names every day that began to use the Masterhost criminal network.
4.3.5 Simulating Takedowns
Using Equation 3, we identify critical vertices in the case study networks and simulate
takedowns by producing the network-level and domain-level takedown CDFs in Fig-
ure 10 and Figure 11, respectively. These CDFs show the proportion of networks or
domain names removed from the criminal network against the loss in the total amount
of potential victim lookups that were made to the entire criminal network. Successful
takedowns will manifest as superlinear CDFs, denoting that we can eliminate many
potential victims by selectively removing few critical vertices in the criminal network.
The aggregate DNS lookup volume to the malicious infrastructure proxies the po-
tential loss in victim population; intuitively, infrastructure that is queried frequently
is likely to cause the greatest problems to the attacker if it is taken down. In the
two largest cases, the Rustock criminal network and Masterhost criminal network, we
see the network-level takedowns are very effective (Figure 10a/10c). In the Rustock
criminal network, removing only 20% of the criminal network infrastructure decreases
to total number of lookups by 70%. In the Masterhost criminal network, we can de-
crease total lookups by 40% by focusing our takedown efforts on the worst 20% of
the networks. Recall from Figures 8b and 9b that the Rustock criminal network had
a dense core of dedicated malicious hosting, while the Masterhost criminal network
did not. This would explain the difference in takedown performance between the
two criminal networks. Figures 11a and 11c show that domain-level takedowns for
these two criminal networks are ineffective, based on the sublinear and linear CDFs.
Intuitively, this makes sense as the graphs are very sparse. A single domain name
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is unlikely to substantially damage the infrastructure because the domain names are
less distributed.
Figures 10b and 11b illustrate the difficulty in taking down a well structured
network seen in the MojoHost benign hosting network. Since the underlying network
infrastructure is benign, the miscreants abusing MojoHost must take great care in
distributing their malicious activities, which makes takedowns more difficult. This
also suggests that creating hierarchical criminal networks resilient against takedowns
is possible, but we did not find these structures in the wild.
For the Botnet criminal network, both network-level (Figure 10d) and domain-
level (Figure 11d) takedowns were successful; eliminating 40% of the networks or do-
mains associated with the botnet caused an 80% and 70% decrease in total lookups,
respectively. Since Botnet criminal network has a much higher graph density than
the other case studies, it makes sense that the domain-level takedown would be effec-
tive. However, understanding the success of the network-level takedown requires an
understanding of the type of threats the network facilitates the hosting infrastructure
for. Most of the malicious hosting that uses the Botnet criminal network are for C&C
servers, which need to be highly available. This availability requirement causes the
dense structure, which lowers the discriminatory function of the EC metric as most
nodes will be considered highly important. Our selection process compensates for




































Figure 12: Overview of rza.
CHAPTER V
MEASURING & RECOMMENDING TAKEDOWNS
5.1 rza System
In this section, we detail the internals of rza, our takedown analysis and recommen-
dation system.
5.1.1 Overview
Figure 12 shows the overall process implemented by rza. Given a set of known seed
botnet domains DS, rza can be asked to generate either a “Postmortem Report” or
a “Takedown Recommendation”.
In the “Postmortem Report” mode, the input domains represent the domains
known to have been targeted by an historic takedown. This produces a report that
shows the effectiveness of the takedown of the domain names (Figure 12, step 5a)
with respect to the expanded infrastructure rza identifies.
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In the “Takedown Recommendation” mode, the input domains represent the cur-
rently known malicious domains used for C&C infrastructure. Furthermore, the take-
down recommendation engine explores possible network resources that may be used
by the botnet as a C&C backup mechanism, and suggests any additional measures
that must be taken after the primary C&C is disabled to fully eliminate the threat
(Figure 12, step 5b).
At a high level, the processing steps executed by rza are similar when produc-
ing both the “Postmortem Report” and “Takedown Recommendation”, despite the
difference in inputs and the meaning of the results. The steps are:
1. Expand the initial domain seed set DS using the pDNS database to identify
other domains that are likely related to the botnet’s C&C infrastructure. In-
tuitively, domains are cheap but IP addresses are relatively more expensive.
By identifying additional domains that resolve to the same hosts as malicious
domains, we can identify other potentially malicious domains related to the
botnet.
2. Identify the subset of the expanded domains that are queried by known malware
samples. If a domain both points to a host known to facilitate a C&C and is
also used by known malware, it increases the likelihood of that domain itself
being malicious as well.
3. Identify the subset of the expanded domains with low domain name reputation.
Similar to the intuition of Step 2, a domain that points to a known malicious
host and also has low domain reputation is more likely to itself be malicious.
4. Analyze the malware samples identified in Step 2. In addition to straightforward
dynamic malware analysis, we trick executing malware samples into believing
that their primary C&C infrastructure is unavailable using a custom malware
analysis system [117] to extract additional C&C domain names. Intuitively,
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domains used by malware related to the infrastructure we are studying are likely
to be related and malicious. Furthermore, we use the results of the analysis to
identify malware contingency plans that would allow the botnet to continue to
function after its primary C&C infrastructure has been disabled (e.g., a DGA-
based or P2P C&C).
5. Output either the “Postmortem Report” or “Takedown Recommendation” de-
pending on the mode of operation selected at the beginning.
The guiding principle we follow with rza is to push our understanding of malicious
C&C infrastructure towards completeness. Only once we have fully enumerated the
C&C infrastructure can we successfully disable it. We can begin to enumerate C&Cs
from the network-level by identifying historic relationships between domain names
and hosts using pDNS evidence, and from the host-level by interrogating malware
samples. Since the pDNS may contain additional domains not necessarily related to
the botnet in question, we identify subsets of domains so we can focus our investigative
efforts on those that are most likely to be malicious and not inundate ourselves with
information. Each subset serves a different purpose: the low reputation subset holds
the domain names from the network-level that are most likely to be malicious. The
subset of domains queried by malware represents a reasonable baseline to expect
from prior takedowns, as much of this information is readily available to the security
community. The subset gleaned from malware analysis contains the domains from the
host-level that are the most likely to be malicious. We can use these sets to measure
the effectiveness of past takedowns and recommend domains for future takedowns.
In the remainder of this section we describe each of these high-level tasks in detail,
and discuss how they work together to suggest a takedown response.
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5.1.2 Infrastructure Enumeration
Botnets often make use of the DNS to increase the reliability of their C&C infrastruc-
ture, for example using domain name fluxing or simply replacing retired or blacklisted
domains with new domains. This cycling of domains, however, leaves a trail in the
pDNS database and can be used to enumerate the infrastructure. For example, con-
sider a malware sample m that on day t1 uses domain d1 as its primary C&C domain,
but on day t2 switches to domain d2 to evade the blacklisting of d1. Assume d1 and
d2 resolve to the same IP address. Analysis during either t1 or t2 yields only one of
the possible domains, but the relationship between d1 and d2 can be identified in a
pDNS database because both resolved to the same IP address.
Using the passive DNS database and the seed domain set DS, we compute the enu-
merated infrastructure domain set De using Algorithm 2. First, the related-historic
IPs (RHIP) of DS are retrieved and known sinkhole, parking, and private IP addresses
are removed. The related-historic domain names (RHDN) for the remaining IPs are
retrieved, and any benign domain names are removed, yielding the enumerated infras-
tructure of DS: De. The relationships retrieved from the pDNS database are within
a range of dates to ignore historic relationships that are no longer relevant.
Input: DS, startdate, enddate: seed domain set, and bounding dates
Output: De: enumerated domain set
Ib ← set of known sinkhole, private, parking IPs
Wd ← set of Alexa top 10,000 domain names
I ← RHIP (DS, startdate, enddate)
I ← I \ Ib
De ← RHDN(I, startdate, enddate)
De ← De \Wd
return De
Algorithm 2: Infrastructure enumeration procedure.
To understand why we filter out benign domains consider an attacker that, in an
attempt to mislead our analysis, temporarily has their malicious domains resolve into
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benign IP space (e.g., Google’s) or uses a popular hosting provider (e.g., Amazon
AWS). If either of these occur, the De domain set may include unrelated, benign
domain names. To handle this, we filter domains if they are a member, or are a
subdomain of a member, of the set of the Alexa top 10,000 domain names. These
domains are unlikely to be persistently malicious and should not be considered for
takedown. IP addresses that are non-informative (private, sinkhole, etc.) are also
removed, as the domains that resolve to them are unlikely to be related. For example,
malware domains sometimes point to private IP addresses (e.g., 127.0.0.1) when
they are not in use, which if not removed would link otherwise unrelated domain
names. We use the Alexa top 10,000 in Section 3.3.3, and for consistency we use it
here as well. In future work we intend to explore the effect of using smaller and larger
whitelists on the generated sets and their accuracy.
5.1.3 Categorizing the Expanded Infrastructure
Not all domains identified during the infrastructure enumeration process are guaran-
teed to be malicious, but we can identify subsets that are more likely to be malicious.
For example, a domain that resolves to an IP address in a virtual web hosting provider
is likely to have many benign and unrelated domains that resolve to the same infras-
tructure as well. To account for this, we focus on domains with known (often public)
malware associations, and domains that have low domain name reputation.
Using the passive DNS, we expand the initial seed domain set, DS, into the ex-
panded set De. Next, we identify Dm ⊆ De and Dr ⊆ De, the subset of domain
names in De with known malware associations and low domain name reputation, re-
spectively. Malware associations are retrieved from our domain name to malware MD5
database and are commonly available in the security community [181]. To determine
if a domain name has low reputation, we use a system similar in spirit to [4, 14] which
scores domain reputation between 0.0 and 1.0, where 1.0 denotes a low reputation
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(i.e., likely malicious) domain name. Any domains with > 0.5 reputation are consid-
ered malicious and are added to Dr. Unlike Dr and Dm, the set Di is not necessarily
a subset of De. Any domains that are used by malware during malware interrogation
are added to Di. These domains expand our coverage as they may unearth domain
names that were not previously included in De. During our postmortem analysis, we
compare these sets to the domains that were actually involved in the takedown (DS).
Figure 13 shows a Venn diagram representation of a possible configuration of
enumerated infrastructure sets. All sets, excluding Di, are subsets of De. Di is the
most likely to include domains outside of the scope of De, but suffers the most from








Dr: low reputation domains
Ds: seed domains
Di: malware interrogation domains
Figure 13: Venn diagram of identified infrastructure sets.
5.1.4 Takedown Recommendation Engine
Using the four aforementioned techniques, we can run our takedown protocol as
shown by the decision tree in Figure 14. Suppose we are interested in tak-
ing down a hypothetical botnet where the current known infrastructure is DS =
{01.hans.gruber.com}. After enumerating the infrastructure, we identify the addi-
tional domain name 02.hans.gruber.com that resolves to the same IP as the 01 child
domain. We identify and retrieve the malware samples that have queried the 01...
and 02... domain names and interrogate them. We identify an additional domain
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name, 03.hans.gruber.com, when the first two domain names fail to resolve. Since
we identified a finite number of new domain names, we re-run the process with the
expanded set of three domain names and this time the malware analysis yields no be-
havioral changes from what we have already identified. In the event a DGA or a P2P
backup scheme is present, the DGA must be reverse-engineered or the P2P network
must be subverted as described in [142] after disabling the main C&C infrastructure,
respectively.
The question remains which sets of domains should be revoked or sinkholed in
order to terminate the botnet’s C&C infrastructure, which ultimately must be decided
by human operators. In the case where eliminating the botnet is more important
than any possible collateral damage that may be incurred, the set of domains in
De ∪ Di should be targeted, which we consider to be the “nuclear” option. This
contains any domain name associated with the C&C infrastructure as well as domains
queried by the related malware. In other scenarios, however, this may incur too
much collateral damage. We recommend revoking Dr ∪ Di instead in these cases,
as these domains are very likely to be malicious. These decisions should be made
by threat researchers based on the potential risks associated with deactivating these
domain names. Another, less extreme option is to simply block these domains at the
network’s egress point. This allows enterprise-sized networks to protect themselves
while lessening the negative impact incurred by collateral damage.
Ground truth for C&C infrastructure is difficult to come by, which makes evalu-
ating true positives and false positives exceedingly difficult. To roughly estimate this,
we present the precision and recall of each set against the “correct” set of Dr ∪ Di.
If we assume that domains flagged as low reputation or used by malware known to
be affiliated with a given botnet are malicious, we can use this union to roughly cor-
respond to ground truth. In our case, the precision of a set D is the fraction of the
number of domain names d that are d ∈ D ∧ d ∈ Dr ∪Di over the size of D or |D|
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and the recall is the fraction between the same number of domain names as in the
























Figure 14: Takedown recommendation engine shown as a decision tree. D in this
case represents either Dr ∪Di, which only targets C&C domains that are very likely
to be malicious or De ∪ Di, or the “nuclear” option that should only be used when
the threat of the botnet outweighs potential collateral damage.
5.2 Postmortem Studies
In this section, we describe how we use rza to evaluate historical takedowns. We
introduce the takedowns we study and describe the measurements we use to under-
stand the effectiveness of the takedown. We end the section with our experimental
results on the postmortem studies.
5.2.1 Postmortem Analysis
For our postmortem analysis, we chose to study the takedowns of Kelihos [111] (aka
Operation b79), a Zeus botnet instance [113] (aka Operation b71), and the 3322.org
NS takedown that targeted the Nitol botnet [112] (aka Operation b70). We chose
these takedowns because they are both recent and high profile. For each takedown,
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we collect the domains described in the temporary restraining orders (TRO) and use
these as our seed domains (DS).
Measuring Takedown Improvement Prior studies of botnet takedowns relied
on secondary measurements, such as global spam volumes, to determine the success
of a takedown. Instead, we directly measure the successful domain name resolutions
to the identified infrastructure to proxy for the victim population. By comparing
the lookup volume to the seed domains (DS) with the lookup volume to the sets
of domains identified by rza, we can determine if a takedown was successful and
what domains it missed. For example, if all domain sets are equivalent, their lookup
volumes will be identical and the takedown would be considered successful.
More formally, for each takedown, t, and its collected seed domains, DtS, we gener-






i using rza. D
t
e is generated
using only successful DNS resolutions that were issued during the seven days before
the takedown of t was performed according to the court documents1. This allows us
to compare what was actually disabled and/or sinkholed during the takedown with
what rza would have recommended.
For a period of 14 days surrounding the takedown, we plot the successful aggregate
daily lookup volume to each of the previously identified sets. To quantify the gains






Where D1 and D2 are two domain name sets and MDLV is a function on domain
name sets that computes the median daily successful lookup volume. We use the
1These are September 11th, 2012; March 25th, 2012 and September 26th, 2011 for the 3322.org,
Zeus and Kelihos takedowns, respectively.
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median, rather than the mean, since we are interested in preserving long-term lookup
volume trends, which are not captured by outliers. If TIR(Dtm, D
t
S) > 1, this means
the subset of De of malware-related domain names D
t
m had a stronger lookup volume
and accounts for domain names missed by the takedown domains DtS. Conversely, if
the TIR ≤ 1, the takedown deactivated related malware domains already and was
successful. We also identify malware backup behaviors.
Estimating Risk To provide a different perspective, we also quantify the potential
risk of collateral damage, or the negative effect of mistakenly taking down benign
domains. Ideally, we would represent this by the number of distinct clients that
would be denied access to benign services, however, we can once again turn to the
lookup volumes to proxy for this.
If we assume all infected botnet hosts behave identically, the aggregate lookup
volume on a given day is proportional to the number of infected clients. At most,
a single lookup corresponds to a distinct client reaching that domain, however, due
to DNS caching effects, differences in malware variant and human behaviors, and
network address translation (NAT), this is likely an overestimation of the actual
client population. We assume that these behaviors are consistent with respect to
queries towards a given botnet.
We quantify the potential risk of collateral damage for a takedown as the difference
in the median lookup volume between an enumerated set and the initial seed domain
set as defined by Equation 5.
Risk(D1, D2) = MDLV (D1)−MDLV (D2) (5)
Using similar notation as seen in Equation 4. Intuitively, the difference between
these two quantities is proportional to the number of individuals that would be in-
convenienced by this takedown if all the domains in D1 that are not in D2 are not
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malicious. This provides an upper bound on the potential risk involved. The “nuclear
option” of taking down all the domains in De, or sinkholing all domains that resolve
to hosts known to provide C&C for a botnet, is the only way to ensure the C&C
communication line is severed, however, this should be weighed against the potential
risks.
An analyst wishing to perform a takedown can use the risk values to weigh whether
to employ the “nuclear” option or the more reserved options as described in Sec-
tion 5.1.4. In future work, we hope to improve the risk measure in two ways. First,
we can correlate the risk value with the identified true and false positive rates during
a real, or simulated, takedown. Furthermore, we wish to more accurately estimate the
true population of visitors to infrastructure, malicious or otherwise. This can further
help analysts by allowing them to weigh the likelihood of maliciousness against the
population that would be affected by a takedown.
For each of the following takedown postmortem analysis, the dashed red line on
each plot indicates the date the takedown was performed according to the court
proceedings. Each line plot represents the aggregate daily lookup volume to a subset
of domains that are either directed to a sinkhole or contained within the enumerated
infrastructure sets generated by rza. In all cases the De lookup volume represents an
upper bound of malicious lookups.
5.2.2 Kelihos
The Kelihos botnet was a spam botnet that sent approximately four billion spam
messages[114] a day in its first iteration and was targeted for takedown in late 2011.
We show the daily volumes for the sets DS, De and Dm for Kelihos in Figure 15. The
day Kelihos was taken down, we see lookups to the seed domains completely stop,
showing that these domains were effectively remediated. The court order did not
specify sinkholes to be used, which explains why the domains simply cease to resolve.
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Table 10: TIR and Risk values for Kelihos takedown. These values represent the
improvement to a takedown based on rza’s output and the potential risk of collateral
damage, respectively.
Sets TIR value Risk
Dm, DS 0.913 -399.5
Dr, DS 5.690 21,555
Di, DS 0.022 -4,492.5
De, DS 10.230 42,415.5
The set of malware-related domains, Dm, and interrogated domains, Di, also cut off
sharply at this point, with a handful of successful resolutions occurring for Dm a few
days after the takedown date and ceasing to resolve afterwards. This suggests the
initial takedown missed some domains, but these were quickly remediated as well.
Dr has a spike similar to De, and upon further investigation the spike was revealed
to be a malicious domain that resolved into Kelihos’ infrastructure but could not be
confirmed to be a Kelihos C&C. This domain stopped resolving after the peak date
(September 24th).
The computed TIR values are shown in Table 10. Much like the daily volumes
figure, the TIR values suggest this takedown was successful. We see large TIR values
for De and Dr, which indicate additional malicious domains were left unperturbed
that resolved into Kelihos’ hosting infrastructure. The similar trend between De and
Dr suggests that many of the extended infrastructure domains are in fact malicious
and could have been removed during the Kelihos takedown effort.
For the De and Dm sets, we have precision and recall of 0.22/0.67 and 0.25/0.03,
respectively. The recall for De is quite low as this means upwards of 30% of the
domain names that are likely malicious were harvested from malware interrogation.
This stresses the importance of labeling both from network information from pDNS,
as well as information gathered from malware.
According to the analysis by rza, this takedown was largely a success, however,
we know that new variants of Kelihos emerged soon after. Analyzing its 168 malware
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samples from before the takedown shows that a P2P C&C mechanism existed as
a backup plan in the malware, which may have helped bootstrap its resurgence.
This stresses the importance of being prepared to counter malware behavior after its
primary infrastructure has been disabled.
Figure 15: Kelihos aggregate daily lookup volume (log-scale).
5.2.3 Zeus
The Zeus takedown targeted a large botnet that used the popular malware kit Zeus
to create its malware. This takedown relied on sinkholing the seed domains. We show
the daily volumes for the sets DS, De, Dm, Dr, as well the volumes for domains in
De that resolve into sinkholes operated by Microsoft and the other sinkholing party,
in Figure 16. Of the 2,825 malware samples analyzed, none of them included a P2P-
or DGA-based contingency plan.
The first observation is that unlike in the case of Kelihos, Microsoft began sinkhol-
ing domains before the date specified in the court order as evidenced by the non-zero
query volume resolving into Microsoft’s sinkholes before the takedown date. To re-
iterate, domains that resolved only to the sinkhole before the takedown date were
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not included to prevent prior uses of the sinkhole from interfering with our results.
Furthermore, the volume of lookups that resolve into the sinkhole are orders of mag-
nitude larger than the lookups only to the seed domains, suggesting that domains
not specified in the court order were also sinkholed. We see a spike in lookup traffic
directed towards the seed domains and domains that resolve to Microsoft’s sinkhole,
indicating increased sinkholing action at the time of takedown. rza’s Dm set captured
fewer domains than those sunk by Microsoft’s sinkhole, however, there is a large dis-
crepancy in lookups to domains flagged as malicious by our reputation system, i.e.,
lookups to the domains in set Dr. We see a drop in lookups to Dr that corresponds to
the Microsoft sunk domains, which indicates Dr subsumes the set of sunk domains.
The other sinkhole operation experienced a similar drop after the Microsoft takedown,
which suggests there was contention over which domains belonged to which sinkhole.
In this takedown, the ad-hoc nature of takedowns made coordination between com-
panies difficult and the lack of oversight allowed the court order to not be followed
exactly. While Microsoft was clearly sinkholing more domain names, the takedown
interfered with an existing takedown. Without a centralized method of communicat-
ing who is sinkholing what, this pattern of stepping on other researchers’ toes is likely
to continue.
The computed TIR values are shown in Table 11. We compare against both the
seed domain set, and the set of domains resolving into Microsoft’s sinkhole. With
respect to the seed domain set, we nearly tie considering malware-related domains
and capture many more lookups to potentially malicious domains when considering
the dataset derived from reputation, Dr. The story is similar when compared to
domains that resolve into the Microsoft sinkhole, but to a lesser extent. Recall the
volumes for Microsoft sinkhole resolutions only include domains we identified in De.
This suggests that not only were these deemed malicious by a 3rd party, but they
were added by Microsoft independent of the domains listed in the court order.
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Table 11: TIR and Risk values for Zeus takedown.
Sets TIR value Risk
Dm, DS 0.979 -11,357.5
Dr, DS 3.921 1,641,580
Di, DS 0.148 -478,874
De, DS 14.321 7,486,221
Dm, Dmssink 0.553 -444,265.5
Dr, Dmssink 2.215 1,208,672
Di, Dmssink 0.084 -911,782
De, Dmssink 8.091 7,053,313
For the De and Dm sets, we have precision and recall of 0.03/0.98 and 0.30/0.01,
respectively. Most of these values are quite low, with the exception of De’s recall,
which is unsurprising. This indicates most of the malicious domains could be identified
through passive DNS. The low precision value for De indicates that many of these
domains should probably not be targeted in a takedown and the low precision for
Dm suggests that while many have low reputation and are likely malicious there are
no known malware associations, reinforcing the motivation for using domain name
reputation.
Figure 16: Zeus aggregate daily lookup volume (log-scale).
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5.2.4 3322.org
The 3322.org takedown represents the most extreme case where rza would have im-
proved a takedown’s effectiveness. This takedown was accomplished by transferring
the entire 3322.org Name Server’s (NS) authority to Microsoft and domains deemed
malicious resolved to a set of known sinkhole IP addresses. The daily volume plot for
3322.org is shown in Figure 17. Unlike the Zeus takedown, domains were sunk on the
day of the takedown and were limited to *.3322.org domain names. Unfortunately,
this only accounted for a fraction of the lookups to domains with known malware
associations, Dm, and domains with low reputation, Dr that resolved to hosts known
to support malicious activity. We notice a drop in lookups to Dm and Dr when the
takedown is performed, showing that most of the domains targeted by the takedown
were likely malicious, however, the lookups to remaining infrastructure identified by
rza are still frequent. We see Di closely matches the sinkholed domain names, sug-
gesting this is the primary method that was used to identify the takedown domains.
Unlike the previous two cases, all enumerated sets have TIR values greater than one.
This agreement suggests that malicious domains were almost certainly missed during
the 3322.org takedown effort. Of the 10,135 malware samples we analyzed, none of
them had a P2P- or DGA-based contingency plan.
This case shows the importance of using multiple sources to determine related
malicious infrastructure before performing a takedown. Simply identifying domains
with known malware associations offers a substantial improvement on the effectiveness
of the takedown. Further, the similarity between the Dm and Dr trends shows most
of the domains overlap between the two, which only further bolsters the likelihood
that they are indeed malicious. To make matters worse, all the domains that were
not sinkholed were given enterprise-level domain name resolution services, despite
the high probability they were involved in malicious activities. The computed TIR
values for the 3322.org takedown are shown in Table 12. Unlike the previous two
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Table 12: TIR and Risk values for 3322.org takedown.
Sets TIR value Risk
Dm, Dmssink 13.821 409,593.5
Dr, Dmssink 18.956 573,627.5
Di, Dmssink 1.049 1,560
De, Dmssink 654.940 20,890,774
postmortems, rza identified numerous additional malicious domains that were left
undisturbed by the takedown on 3322.org.
For the De and Dm sets, we have precision and recall of 0.06/0.95 and 0.38/0.03,
respectively. These results are similar to those for Zeus and further reinforce the
need to include domain reputation as a measure in rza. Simply relying on passive
DNS (for De) and malware associations (for Dm) overestimate and underestimate the
malicious domain names, respectively.
Figure 17: 3322.org aggregate daily lookup volume (log-scale).
5.3 Takedown Recommendation Analysis
In this section, we run rza’s takedown protocol on 45 botnet C&Cs being tracked by
Damballa, Inc. during the month of April, 2013 and present the results. We chose
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to use the C&Cs already tracked by Damballa out of convenience and it is important
to stress that they could be substituted by any set of domain names known to corre-
spond to a botnet’s C&C infrastructure. There are many publicly available sources of
this information that allow similar experiments to be repeated. The calculated TIR
values and predicated backup plans for the 45 botnets are shown in Table 13 and the
associated Risk values are shown in Table 14.
Overall, the TIR values indicate we are gaining additional infrastructure infor-
mation as we did in the postmortem cases. Similarly, we see very large TIRs for
the expanded infrastructure set, De, further evidence that infrastructure related
by the passive DNS includes additional domains that need to be narrowed down
by categorizing the domain sets. These TIR values were smaller, as we saw with
the postmortems, with the malware-related and reputation-based sets—Dm and Dr,
respectively—contributing the bulk of the newly observed lookup volumes.
In addition to describing the enumerated infrastructure sets, we also identify the
backup mechanisms, if any, present in the botnet. If a botnet’s malware has no
backup plan, it is a prime candidate for a smooth, DNS-only takedown, otherwise
we have identified the necessary conditions for performing an effective takedown.
The most important finding, however, is that of the 45 botnets we studied 42 of
them had no contingency plan for central C&C failure, suggesting the bulk of these
botnets can be successfully taken down without requiring additional measures, such
as reverse engineering a DGA or combating a P2P-based C&C. This suggests that
while performing a takedown is difficult, we are likely to succeed in many cases.
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Table 13: Recent botnet TIR values (compared against DS) and backup plan classi-
fication.
ID De Dm Dr Di Backup Plan
1 7.229 2.719 6.815 1.446 finite-domain
2 13.669 0.000 23.891 275.751 p2p
3 0.856 0.000 0.764 0.142 none
4 2.808 1.158 2.602 0.554 dga
5 12.005 10.117 11.612 0.023 none
6 20.632 1.448 15.665 0.044 none
7 2.130 0.015 0.798 11.917 none
8 289.387 154.932 233.521 0.000 none
9 42.570 0.000 23.522 1.395 finite-domain
10 0.746 0.000 0.597 0.241 finite-domain
11 3.783 1.068 3.208 0.255 none
12 13.115 3.809 11.896 0.246 none
13 10.139 1.698 8.726 0.697 none
14 8.266 0.000 8.259 3.190 none
15 2.028 0.189 0.131 0.094 finite-domain
16 471.226 76.176 392.788 1.045 finite-domain
17 87.004 33.807 72.759 4.052 none
18 27.036 1.810 14.952 1.021 none
19 8715.005 816.740 8696.197 8.520 none
20 170.752 0.743 10.210 0.405 finite-domain
21 7.260 2.012 5.828 0.056 none
22 13.492 1.364 12.011 0.000 none
23 14.146 0.000 12.891 7.449 none
24 52.593 0.000 52.174 0.967 finite-domain
25 223.201 6.869 21.504 0.000 none
26 1067.604 0.000 1062.696 0.001 finite-domain
27 293.466 46.070 232.437 0.005 none
28 1.251 0.311 0.923 0.082 dga
29 13.589 0.547 4.886 1.100 finite-domain
30 380.568 27.986 350.686 0.082 none
31 17.700 0.000 16.837 0.500 finite-domain
32 5.857 4.679 5.724 0.575 finite-domain
33 25.042 4.085 21.460 3.094 none
34 0.156 0.139 0.152 0.014 finite-domain
35 25.048 1.272 15.638 0.000 none
36 12.121 7.364 11.183 0.336 finite-domain
37 11.698 10.329 11.544 2.321 none
38 91.364 0.457 9.618 0.000 none
39 4.640 1.085 3.694 0.599 finite-domain
40 7.491 0.303 6.865 257.059 finite-domain
41 3.161 0.485 2.700 0.187 finite-domain
42 2.378 0.487 2.372 1.288 finite-domain
43 33.227 12.958 31.650 3.014 none
44 21.761 2.219 3.061 1.108 none
45 2.217 0.101 2.150 0.103 none
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Table 14: Recent botnet Risk values (compared against DS).
ID De Dm Dr Di
1 376,591 103,904 351,529 26,974
2 6260 −494 11,312 135,766
3 −7425 −51,681 −12,205 −44,352
4 694,233 60,473 614,941 −171,099
5 485,427 402,158 468,070 −44,110
6 362,341 8262 270,663 −18,457
7 6103 −5320 −1088 58,936
8 1,249,414 666,902 1,007,383 −4332
9 255,237 −6140 138,285 2427
10 −5122 −20,195 −8131 −15,320
11 3,024,316 73,348 2,399,494 −1,086,629
12 89,727 20,801 80,695 −7406
13 9,150,880 698,974 7,735,834 −1,001,304
14 17,959 −2472 17,942 5412
15 585 −461 −494 −515
16 4,106,017 656,434 3,421,089 −8732
17 80,537 30,721 67,197 −936
18 3128 97 1676 −120
19 277,603 25,987 277,004 −32
20 5,719,294 −8674 310,317 −33,692
21 1,061,289 171,489 818,507 −169,516
22 5,586,161 162,678 4,923,961 −447,172
23 478,741 −36,417 433,040 234,848
24 204,816 −3970 203,153 −130
25 9,034,976 238,626 833,715 −40,652
26 31,892,669 −29,901 31,745,933 −29,860
27 2,023,910 311,893 1,601,580 −6889
28 692 −1897 −212 −2528
29 26,164,386 −942,098 8,075,579 −2,078,370
30 341,286 24,265 314,418 −825
31 23,614 −1414 22,393 −707
32 392,925 297,607 382,154 −34,345
33 3,798,382 487,342 3,232,483 −157,989
34 −6385 −6519 −6416 −7466
35 468,361 5289 285,099 −19,476
36 741,041 424,070 678,530 −44,278
37 452,686 394,741 446,180 −42,314
38 6,688,344 −40,216 637,882 −74,015
39 1,676,605 39,173 1,240,928 −184,676
40 5,515,527 −592,194 4,983,178 217,562,247
41 160,793 −38,321 126,529 −60,522
42 224,265 −83,469 223,419 46,946
43 243,983 90,534 232,045 −7571
44 3,648,885 214,216 362,154 −175,760




One of the most difficult aspects of performing a takedown is identifying and avoiding
potential collateral damage, as noted in past takedowns [62]. While there are many
kinds of collateral damage, we focus on identifying a particularly heinous kind: ad-
vanced persistent threat (APT) infrastructure. Not only are APTs a serious threat to
be handled in their own right, they frequently use compromised machines to support
their infrastructure, both of which makes them ideal targets for takedown as well
as increased care due to the possibility of disabling legitimate infrastructure in the
process.
6.1 What We Know About APT
Threats focused on espionage or intellectual property theft are difficult to automate
beyond exploitation or lateral movement within the target network. Intuitively, it is
difficult to know exactly what intellectual property ought to be stolen from a net-
work, how the data are labeled, and where they are located. The manual nature of
such operations is illustrated by C&C monitoring occurring during business hours in
the perpetrator’s country [42] and in sleeping behavior [165, 104] seen in the C&C
infrastructure. For example, “domain names used ... only point to actual control in-
frastructure during very short time windows” and resolve to “parked” or local/private
IP space (e.g., 127.0.0.1, 0.0.0.0, etc.) [165] when not in use. This lowers the profile of
the malware in the target’s network and makes it far less detectable by conventional
means.
When a threat actor wishes to explore the network, she changes the domain name
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to resolve to an active host and the infected machines phone home to provide remote
access. After the exploration is complete, the domain name is once again parked to a
local/private IP address. This manual behavior is entrenched such that “when they
need to change the IP resolution of [a domain], they simply log in to these services and
update the IP resolution of their [domain] via a web-based interface” [104], further
reinforcing the manual efforts that take place in infrastructure management. While
automating the process of updating a domain name resolution is trivial, knowing
exactly when an attacker wishes to poke around a victim network is not.
Most of the APT reports we studied [84, 105, 104, 165, 95, 61, 64, 137] rely on
domain names for C&C communication. Domain names are cheap (or free), easy to
use, and employed by the run-of-the-mill remote access tools (RAT), a common tool
for APT actors, making them a natural choice for infrastructure. Some threats [65]
do not use the DNS, but these are less agile, easier to detect, and are not the focus of
this paper. While it is possible to design C&Cs that operate over covert channels [88],
bypassing the DNS entirely, we consider this outside of the scope of this paper as such
an APT has never been uncovered.
APTs commonly make use of compromised machines, or “stepping stones,” to
route traffic as “camouflage for their attacks” [104]. Many reports [84, 105, 104, 165,
95, 61, 64] confirm the use of stepping stones in APT C&C infrastructure and sug-
gest in many cases they are compromised machines. Using compromised machines
for infrastructure has two primary benefits: C&C infrastructure can be “near” the
infection site so that alarms will not be raised, and compromised infrastructure does
not leave behind a money trail, giving plausible deniability to the APT actors. In
either case, we expect to see both benign and APT-related domain names on a given
host used for APT C&C infrastructure. In fact, some APT instances required com-
promised machines to achieve their ends. In one APT that targeted the financial
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sector, IP whitelisting at the targeted bank’s edge network necessitated compromis-
ing a whitelisted machine to act as a proxy for the C&C to be tunneled through [105].
Lessons Learned Advanced persistent threats (APT) are vague and differentiating
them in a reliable, automated fashion from traditional threats and malware is difficult.
Based on reports from industry, we focus on a class of APTs, called “manual APTs”,
that are: manually operated, primarily DNS-based, and make use of compromised
machines to proxy command and control (C&C) messages.
It is possible for APT actors to evade these assumptions, but it comes at a great
cost to the operators. By not relying on traditional infrastructure, they evade po-
tential attribution pitfalls. In the case of APT threats, simply being able to reliably
pin the origin of an attack to a country or organization is enough to cause geopolit-
ical strain, which is not the case for traditional botnets. One must only look to the
political issues between the United States and China to see the potential downfall to
APT attribution. It is in the best interest of the attackers to lie low and maintain
plausible deniability. Relying on carefully maintained, compromised assets in lieu of
traditional infrastructure is paramount to successful APT operations. We focus on
these common properties in the threats we studied to derive the features we use for
modeling in ghost&rae.
6.2 System Overview
Our system, ghost&rae, is composed of three logical components: a data collection
component, a supervised learning component, and an unsupervised learning compo-
nent. An overview of the entire system is presented in Figure 18.
The first step for the system is to collect various datasets (i.e., passive DNS, BGP
routes, APT reports) and properly store them in a distributed file system. Once this
operation is complete, the dataset becomes available to the two learning components










































Figure 18: Overview of ghost&rae APT detection system.
to provide reports to knowledgeable network operators to improve their ability to
respond to APT threats in their networks.
The supervised component (Steps 2-4, Figure 18) classifies resource records (RRs)
as being APT or non-APT related. It can also convict entire domain name zones by
taking a majority vote of the RRs under a zone. For example, if ftp.evil.com,
www.evil.com, pop.evil.com are domains that are classified as APT, APT and
non-APT, respectively, and are the only subdomains of evil.com seen in our passive
DNS database, the system would convict the entire evil.com zone as APT-related. In
addition to simple classifications, the supervised component also provides a confidence
score that denotes how likely it is that the RR belongs to one of the two classes. This
is used to improve the unsupervised component.
The unsupervised component in ghost&rae comprises Steps 5-7 in Figure 18. At
a high-level, it clusters together related APT infrastructures by observing the rela-
tionships between domain names and IP addresses. Not only does this make evalua-
tion and report generation easier, it also allows us to group similar APT campaigns.
Given our assumptions, we expect a given IP address to be resolved by both APT and
non-APT domain names, so we must inform the unsupervised component how to dis-
tinguish between these two classes and perform a clean separation between targeted
attacks. Using the classification output from the APT modeling module, we weight
these relations based on their likelihood of maliciousness to distinguish between APT
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and non-APT domain names when clustering. Clusters are ranked by their likelihood
of being APT-related and presented to operators for manual inspection (Step 8, Fig-
ure 18). This allows network operators to prioritize their limited time on the most
relevant threats.
6.3 Methodology
In this section we discuss the internals of ghost&rae. First, we explain the type of
data we collect. We then move into the two learning modules, where we discuss our
modeling and clustering processes. Finally, we conclude by discussing how the user
of the system can tune and make use of ghost&rae’s daily reporting.
6.3.1 Datasets
In addition to the datasets described in Section 2.1.2, ghost&rae also requires: known
APT infrastructure and an autonomous system to IP address mapping. The first is
used to bootstrap our ground truth for building ghost&rae’s modeling component.
The latter is used to extract the features, and to build the relations for the unsuper-
vised component.
The reports described in Section 2.1 are used to build our initial ground truth.
In industry reports, indicators of compromise (IOC) are typically provided in the
form of domain names and/or IP addresses known to support APT infrastructure.
We model known APT infrastructure behavior over time to detect and cluster future
threats. When our system identified additional APT infrastructure, we added these
to our ground truth when we could find third-party reports confirming them as IOCs
for APT threats.
Every IP address belongs to an autonomous system (AS), which advertises routes,
a collection of BGP prefixes, which inform other ASes how to route packets to the
IP addresses contained within the advertising AS. In a nutshell, this is how packets
are routed to a given IP address. These rough collections of IP addresses form logical
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groupings. By parsing public data from Route Views [110], we maintain a database
that, given an IP address, can output the AS, BGP prefix, AS name, and the country
code the IP address is allocated to.
6.3.2 Supervised Learning
The supervised learning component in ghost&rae is composed of two modules: the
feature extraction and APT modeling modules. These modules work together to
produce two reports. The first is a per-zone APT report, which helps the operator of
the system determine the per-zone probability of being APT-related. The next report
is a per-resource record report, where the system will provide an APT confidence score
for all the classified RRs.
6.3.2.1 Feature Extraction Module
We focus on a class of APT threats that are: 1) manually operated, 2) primarily DNS-
based, and 3) make use of compromised machines as “stepping stones.” With these
assumptions and the intuitions we draw from publicly disclosed targeted attacks, we
identify several families of statistical features that can be used to model DNS behavior
indicative of this class of APT threats. These features are summarized in Table 15.
Potential consequences of evading the described features are discussed in detail in
Section 7.1.2.
Most features are computed for a given domain name d, a resource record (RR)
that is a tuple (d, ip) of domain d and its resolved IP address ip, d →r ip, or the
set of IP addresses IP that d has ever resolved to d →r IP . A visual representation
of infrastructure supporting both APT and non-APT domain names is shown in
Figure 19.
From the beginning of our feature selection process we considered the idea of
feature robustness. Specifically, we choose features that could only be evaded with
a non-negligible “cost” to the adversaries, such as increases in noise, monetary and
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Table 15: Summary of APT modeling features
Family Description Formal Description










For a given d, the distribution of resolutions by
corporate or enterprise (ent)/ISP (isp) recursive
DNS sensors, the proportion of enterprise to ISP,
and the count.
|Sent ∪ Sisp|, |Sent||Sent∪Sisp| ,
RPisp,median(RPisp), var(RPisp),
RPent,median(RPent), var(RPent)
DNS Zone Features # resolutions, DynDNS domain, non-routable
resolutions, e2ld domain zone count
-
managerial costs, raising the detection and attribution profile, and causing a decrease
in the overall network agility of the infrastructure. Thus, the attackers must choose
between either “manual-and-slow” functionality or open themselves to detection by
existing techniques (e.g., reputation systems). We briefly explain the difficulty attack-
ers face when attempting to evade the features after describing each feature below.
A summary of the consequences attackers face from possible evasions as well as the


























Figure 19: Infrastructure that supports both non-APT (left) and APT (right) domain



























Figure 20: Example cluster showing infrastructure relationship between known APT
domains (dotted line border) and unknown domains.
On/Off Behavior In order to “lie low” and prevent detection, APT threats com-
monly disable domain names by having them resolve to local and/or non-routable IP
addresses (e.g., 127.0.0.1) when the attackers are not actively using them. Consider
an APT attacker that makes use of a common off-the-shelf remote access tool (RAT)
malware. Most tools periodically “phone home” to their command and control (C&C)
server, generating network traffic that may trigger an alarm. If the domain name used
for the C&C, however, resolves to a non-routable IP address, this traffic never leaves
the perimeter network and evades detection at the network’s edge. When the attacker
wishes to examine the network or exfiltrate sensitive data, she manually changes the
domain to resolve to one of many compromised hosts, allows the malicious activity
to complete, and “turns off” the domain name to resolve back to the “benign” host.
Intuitively, we expect this to differ by being “more sporadic” than typical malicious or
popular domains, that will resolve regularly. APT actors that attempt to evade this
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feature family will have malware that is far noisier than they currently are, putting
them in-line with the noise generated by most malware threats. This may also open
them up to simpler detection systems or ones looking for periodicity (see Table 22).
Given sufficient pDNS visibility, we can identify these gaps and contiguous reso-
lution patterns and use them as features to detect APT behavior. For a given RR on
day t, we consider a resolution successful if it was resolved on t by at least one host
in our network to a routable IP address and unsuccessful if we did not see it resolve.
We can model the on/off behavior by using the distribution of contiguous chunks
of successful and unsuccessful resolutions as features, characterized by their mean,
median and variance in lengths. More formally, consider the bitstring Rd,ip ∈ {0, 1}n
that denotes n days of resolution behavior of domain d to IP address ip, where 1
and 0 bits denote a successful or unsuccessful resolution, respectively. Let Cs and
Cu be lists containing the lengths of these runs for successful and unsuccessful res-
olutions, respectively. For example, for Rd,ip = 100011001, we have Cs = [1, 2, 1]
and Cu = [3, 2]. For Rd,ip, the computed features are Cs, median(Cs), var(Cs), Cu,
median(Cu), var(Cu).
Infrastructure Distribution Intuitively, we expect an APT domain name to re-
solve to a wider variety and more distributed hosts than a non-APT domain name
due to the reliance on compromised infrastructure. This follows for two reasons: at-
tackers are unable to choose the location of hosts that are vulnerable to compromise,
and they must maintain an excess of compromised hosts in case some are remedi-
ated by their rightful owners. This results in APT domain names resolving to more,
geographically disparate IP addresses than those that belong to non-APT domains.
Consider a domain name for a small business: it will likely have one IP address for
its website, and possibly another for email hosting, but rarely many more. Attackers
could evade this feature family by using bulletproof hosting in lieu of compromised
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machines as more commodity threats do, however, this increases the likelihood of
attribution through money trail. Plausible deniability is very important for APT
threats due to their potential geopolitical consequences (see Table 22).
For a given domain name, d, and the set of IPs it resolves to d→r IP , we calculate
the distinct number of autonomous system (AS) numbers, BGP prefixes, AS names,
and country codes the IPs in the set IP belong to. Formally, we represent these as
ASN(d), BGP (d), ASNAME(d), and CC(d), respectively. We extract this infor-
mation from the local BGP database we built using the Route Views archive [110].
Similar data can be collected from Team Cymru’s [173] IP to ASN mapping ser-
vice. Overall, we expect these features to be higher for APT domains than non-APT
domains.
Client Lookup Distribution Intuitively, we expect APT threats to be “targeted”
with respect to the clients that query and use its infrastructure. Recall that our
passive DNS data contains which enterprises’ and ISPs’ DNS resolvers resolved a
given resource record. APT domains should be queried disproportionately more by
enterprise DNS recursive resolvers, and occasionally for short periods of time from
ISP DNS recursive resolvers due to work devices being brought home. For non-APT
domains, we expect popular benign domains and traditional malicious domains to be
queried from everywhere with high regularity, and unpopular benign domains to be
queried infrequently, but primarily from ISP sensors. Attackers could “poison” this
feature by generating spurious lookups from around the globe, but this will raise the
noise and operational profile of the threat significantly and open the threat to more
traditional detection systems (see Table 22). With more eyes on the threat, it stands
to reason it will be more likely to be detected elsewhere.
For a given RR (d, ip), our passive DNS data contains the set of enterprise DNS
recursive resolvers, Sent, and the set of ISP DNS recursive resolvers, Sisp, that resolved
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(d, ip). Furthermore, ∀∫ ∈ Sent ∪ Sisp, we know the first date and last date d →r ip
by a DNS recursive resolver ∫ , which allows us to compute the resolution period,
∆∫ ,(d,ip). The first two features in this family are the unique number of DNS recursive
resolvers, |Sent∪Sisp|, and the proportion of enterprise to ISP DNS recursive resolvers,
|Sent|
|Sent∪Sisp| , that resolved (d, ip). The subsequent features capture the distribution of
the resolution period for an RR over enterprise and ISP DNS recursive resolvers. Let
RPent be a vector containing ∀∫∈Sent∆∫ ,(d,ip) and an analogous vector RPisp for ISP
DNS recursive resolvers. As we did for the On/Off feature family, we compute RPisp,
median(RPisp), variant(RPisp) and RPent, median(RPent), var(RPent) as features.
We expect APT domains to be resolved more commonly and for longer periods of
time by enterprise sensors than ISP sensors.
DNS Zone Features In isolation, these features are generally weaker than the pre-
viously described features, but when paired with the earlier features they improve the
accuracy of ghost&rae’s modeling. The remaining features are: the number of times
(d, ip) successfully resolved, whether d uses a dynamic DNS (DynDNS) provider, the
number of non-routable IP addresses in IP where d →r IP , and the number of do-
mains under d’s effective second-level domain zone (E2LD). Evading these features is
possible, but increases the monetary cost to attackers when setting up their infrastruc-
ture eschewing DynDNS (free) domains for paid ones and having to pay for additional
E2LDs rather than using child labels under one paid-for E2LD zone. Furthermore,
by paying for more assets it increases the attribution footprint for the attack, which
further strain international relations. Evading the others increases the noise of the
attack by having more total resolutions (global noise increase) or fewer resolutions to
bogons (network-specific noise increase).
The number of successful resolutions of (d, ip) captures the difference between
popular domains and commodity C&C domains, which will resolve many times, and
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unpopular and APT domains, which resolve relatively fewer times. DynDNS provides
free subdomains, which are used commonly by traditional malicious and APT threats,
and less frequently by unpopular and popular domains. The number of non-routable
IPs resolved by d helps differentiate between a domain name that is sporadically
resolved from one that is disabled by resolving to a non-routable IP address. Under-
standing the effective second-level domain zone feature requires a brief explanation
of the DNS system.
Let Z(d) be a function that returns the effective second-level domain or (e2ld) of
a fully qualified domain name d. Z(d) represents the shortest ancestor of d that is
operated by a single party that is not a registrar or DynDNS provider. For example,
consider d = random.google.com. Z(d) = google.com because Google, Inc. owns
google.com, which it leases from the owner of the .com top-level domain (TLD).
Now, let d = more.random.dyndns.org; in this case, Z(d) = random.dyndns.org
because dyndns.org is a Dynamic DNS (DynDNS) provider and offers subdomains
under *.dyndns.org (or any other e2LD zone under the same authority) for free. Not
only are DynDNS domains commonly free, they also help obfuscate the owner’s origin
since there is no attribution (i.e., WHOIS) information for free DynDNS domains.
The e2ld domain zone count feature is the number of subdomains where Z(d) is a
parent domain, which helps separate benign domains that typically have few child
domains (e.g., www., mail., etc.) from APT domains which heavily use subdomains.
6.3.2.2 APT Modeling Module
After we extract the above features using the Feature Extraction Module, we train
three models to classify infrastructure as being APT-related or not: Naive Bayes,
generalized Linear Regression, and Random Forest. We use these models to classify
RRs and create our two APT reports. We evaluate the models in two ways. First,
we perform 10-fold cross-validation on each model both to show that our features
88
are meaningful and that they can be modeled successfully. Next, we experimentally
identify the time-to-detection (TTD) of APT infrastructure.
We evaluate the APT Modeling Module by the machine learning community stan-
dard of k-fold cross-validation (CV) [53] based on the known labels from our APT
Knowledge Base, and also use the k-fold CV results to empirically select the best
model. k-fold cross-validation is an evaluation technique that partitions the data
into k equal chunks, trains a model against k − 1 chunks, tests against 1 chunk, and
averages the accuracy of the model when training/testing using each arrangement of
chunks. We can compare the results of k-fold CV to determine our best model to use.
For our experiments, we choose k = 10, which is standard in the machine learning
community.
To determine the TTD of the APT Modeling Module, we reserve an early segment
of our ground truth for training, and model and test against future resource records
as we increase our visibility to determine at what “age” we can detect APT domains
in general. As explained in Section 6.3.1, our passive DNS observation period extends
as far back as January 1st, 2011 until the present day. Our ground truth resource
records cover this entire period. We reserve resource records observed during 2011
and 2012 for training, and test against successive cumulative months in 2013, i.e., we
test against January, 2013; January and February, 2013, and so on until we finally
test against all of 2013. In other words, how long until we can detect APT threats
within a network with high accuracy and few false positives. By plotting the average
accuracy, true positive, and false positive rates for successive months, we can identify
the age with which we can classify APT domains with reasonable accuracy.
6.3.2.3 APT Reports
The APT Modeling Module outputs two kinds of APT Reports: an RR-based Report
and a Zone-based Report.
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The RR-based report is a collection of resource records (RR), a predicted clas-
sification label (apt or nonapt), and the model’s predicted likelihood that the RR
is APT-related ([0 − 1], where 0 is certainly nonapt and 1 is certainly apt). This
report is primarily intended for input into the Unsupervised Learning component
of ghost&rae, and an aggregated version of the RR-based Report is generated for
human consumption. This aggregation is presented in the Zone-based Report.
The Zone-based Report is a collection of e2ld zones, a predicted classification label,
and the model’s average predicted likelihood over the RRs seen under the e2ld zone.
The RR-based Report will commonly output many RRs, which makes an aggregation
by zones more useful. Consider the example in Figure 19. While there are many
unique RRs for the APT infrastructure on the right side of the figure, the entire in-
frastructure can be represented using only three e2ld zones (businessconsults.net,
lflinkup.net, and lflinkup.org). If a majority of RRs under an e2ld are classified
as apt, the zone is classified as apt, nonapt otherwise.
6.3.3 Unsupervised Learning
In the unsupervised component of ghost&rae we make use of the APT-likelihood
scores to build “communities” of APT domain names that are similar in two ways:
1) the domain names pointed to the same infrastructure over a period of time, and
2) the average APT-confidence of domain names in these communities should be
high. In other words, the clustering methods should be able to provide us with better
correlations between domain names under the same targeted attack or APT group
and consist primarily of highly likely APT domain names outside of our ground truth.
To achieve this we need to be able to cluster RRs from the entire IPv4 space. To
process this much data, we have to transform and cluster the data we receive from
the RR-based APT report, and properly rank the produced domain name clusters
according to their relevance to our APT models. It is worth noting that it is a bad
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idea to only cluster RRs that have high confidence to the known APT models we
have built using the publicly available ground truth. If we do this, we may exclude
new APT domain names that use known APT infrastructure we have in our ground
truth, but which do not have enough passive DNS history to be properly classified
by our APT models. Thus, we need to include all of the RRs in our RR-based APT
reports.
6.3.3.1 Spectral Clustering Module
To cluster related APT infrastructure, we perform steps five through seven in Fig-
ure 18. The seed for the clustering process is the RR-based APT report. Using the
domain names, IP addresses and the probability for the RR to be APT or not we
build a weighted incidence matrix relating domain names to IP addresses. Next, we
will factorize the matrix for efficiency reasons, and cluster the resulting factorized
matrix. Before we explain how we achieve all these, we provide the intuition behind
this process with a real APT example.
Consider a bipartite graph with IP addresses on one side and domain names that
resolve to them on the other, as in Figure 20. As a general construction, one expects
there to be “natural” clusters of domain names and IP addresses that are related
in some way. The example in Figure 20 shows one such cluster where the domain
names with the dotted line border are known to be affiliated with a particular APT
operator, while the domains without a border are of unknown use. By clustering these
relations, we can group similar domain names by the infrastructure they use. Based
on our assumptions we expect APT and non-APT domains to share infrastructure,
so we must provide additional information to a clustering scheme to separate them.
We use the RR-based APT output to inform our clustering process to accomplish this
separation.
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Figure 21: The M τ n×k sparse matrix that will be used in ghost&rae’s SVD process
during temporal window τ for n domain names and k IPs.
from period τ . More formally we have, rrAPT τ = {di, ipj, Papt(di, ipj)}i=1..n,j=1...k,
where d is the domain name in the RR, ip is that IP address in the RR and Papt(d, ip)
is the APT model’s confidence that the RR is APT-related. From the same RR
dataset rrAPT τ , we can derive the sets RRDτ and RRIP τ . The set RRDτ reflects
the set of domain names in rrAPT τ , where rrAPT τ is the set of IPs in rrAPT τ .
This confidence is bound between 0 and 1. 0 means the model is certain the RR is not
APT-related and 1 means the model is certain the RR is APT-related. We use this
to weight the incidence matrix that corresponds to the bipartite graph we previously
discussed.
A bipartite graph between the RRs found in the rrAPT τ dataset can be repre-
sented as a sparse adjacency matrix M τ . In this matrix (see Figure 21), the rows
and columns correspond to the left and right vertices and a non-zero value at j, i of
the matrix M τ corresponds to an edge between the jth left vertex and the ith right
vertex. We define as wi,j = (2Papt(di, ipi)− 1)2, if RR (di, ipj) ∈ rrAPT τ . If the RR
is not in the rrAPT τ dataset, then the wi,j = 0. We define the weight wi,j in this
way to penalize RRs that have a lower confidence of being APT.
In general, this matrix will be very large, making it difficult to process. Since
the matrix will be very sparse, we can reduce the matrix using singular value de-
composition (SVD). This operation will change the computational complexity from
O
(






, where % is the number of the first eigenval-
ues we will get from factorizing the matrix M τ . Using SVD enables us to efficiently
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INPUT : Sparse matrix M ∈ <n×k, as can be seen in Figure 21.




[2] : Compute the similarity matrix S from M : S = MT ·M
[3] : Compute the first % eigenvectors from S by eigen-decomposition.
Let U ∈ <%×n be the matrix containing n vectors u1, ..., un of size % resulting from the
eigen-decomposition of S (a vector ui is a reduced %-dimensional representation of the i-th
domain name).
[4] : Cluster the produced domain name vectors {ui}i=1,..,n using the X-means
algorithm [127], with a minimum number of clusters = 1 and a maximum number of clusters
= 1, 000.
[5] : Sort clusters by Average APT Probability from the domain names in each produced
cluster.
[6] : Exclude already labeled clusters.
OUTPUT: Clusters of likely APT domains, sorted by average model confidence.
Algorithm 3: An algorithmic representation of the unsupervised component in
ghost&rae. Spectral clustering and cluster characterization processes in ghost&rae,
over a temporal period τ and using the domain name to IP matrix M τ .
model the RR-based dataset. The only variable in our clustering process is the size
of the |RRDτ | set, which tends to be stable over short periods of times (i.e., months).
6.3.3.2 Cluster Characterization Module
Since we are likely to generate many clusters it would be infeasible to manually in-
spect all of them if we wish to yield tangible and useful results. In order to prioritize
the efforts of operators, before we present the clusters to the operators of ghost&rae
we sort them in descending order according to the average APT-probability score
from the domain names in the cluster. Next, we exclude all clusters that only contain
domain names that are already labeled. Thus, the operator, after the unsupervised
learning component has finished, will receive a ranked list APT clusters (Step 7, Fig-
ure 18) for review. These reports are meant to be manually inspected by network
operators to further improve the APT Knowledge Base and constantly update our
ability to model APT infrastructure. Operators of ghost&rae can tune the number
of clusters presented to to cater to their organization’s size. This is to prevent over-
whelming smaller organizations, or to allow for in-depth investigation by dedicated
security response teams if present.
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Table 16: 10-fold cross validation runs for different models in the APT Modeling
Module (averaged across 10 runs).
Model Acc. (%) TPR (%) FPR (%)
Naive bayes 70.18 92.30 41.79
Linear regression 98.44 91.23 1.11
Random forest 99.84 97.92 0.04
6.4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate ghost&rae. For the supervised phase, we perform model
selection to identify the best model to use in practice. Furthermore, we present the
results of the time-to-detection (TTD) experiment that empirically derives the length
of time it takes to begin successfully detecting APT infrastructure. For the unsuper-
vised phase, we explain the results of the clustering output by using ghost&rae to
model/cluster all of IPv4. Specifically, we discuss the improvements made to our
ground truth using its reports, and the structure and size of the clusters in relation to
their average APT score. From these results, we discuss some interesting APT case
studies, including one previously undiscovered threat in Section 6.5.
6.4.1 Supervised Phase Evaluation
We perform 10-fold cross-validation on our ground truth dataset using three modeling
algorithms: random forests, generalized linear regression, and naive bayes. 10-fold
cross-validation is a standard measure for a model’s accuracy and is described in
detail in Section 6.3.2.2. We present the results by showing the average accuracy,
true positive rate, and false positive rate. A table of these comparisons are presented
in Table 16 and a ROC-curve comparing the performance of the models is shown
in Figure 22. Our ground truth contains 47,952 resource records, of which 24,531
are APT-related and 23,421 are non-APT-related. These RRs fall under 11,549 e2ld
zones as described Section 6.3.2.1.
















Figure 22: ROC-curve of different models for the APT Modeling Module.
Figure 22. In general, true positive rates are high for all models, but false positive
rates are poor for glr and exceedingly poor for naive bayes. The exceedingly poor
performance of naive bayes was initially disconcerting, but makes sense given the in-
dependence assumption made by naive bayes. Feature families for APT detection are
not independent. Consider the feature family for the client lookup distribution (see
Table 15). A clean split exists only between popular/traditional malicious domains
and APT-related/unpopular domains, requiring other dependent features to help fur-
ther differentiate APT domains from unpopular domains. This does not preclude
the use of these features, especially since they reduce false positive rates, but it does
necessitate using a model that does not assume feature independence.
Since many of our features rely on historic resolution evidence, it is important to
know when our models can accurately detect APT behavior in an RR after it has
started resolving in our networks. We determine the time-to-detection (TTD) for the
modeling and features we use in ghost&rae. We anticipate that random forest will
continue to outperform the other models, but we include the others for completeness.
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Figure 23: Time-to-Detection for APT-related domains (TP/FP rates) for our chosen
models.
Figure 23 shows the results of this experiment. The true positive rates (TPR) shown
in the top of Figure 23 show largely consistent TPRs for the random forest model,
and a dip in performance for the other models. We initially expected the TPR to
increase over time, but our ground truth contains disproportionately more domains
starting to be used around March, 2013 resulting in the drops in TPR around this
time. The earlier domains were mostly self-contained within the first few months so
were more accurately modeled without future observations. Since TPR are largely
stable for the random forest, we make our time lag decision based on the FPR. Once
again, we see false positive rates (FPR) start off strong while there are fewer APT-
related domains coming “online.” The lowest FPR for the random forest model occurs
during April. For our IPv4 experiment, we will only consider domains with at least
a four month observation period to focus on resource records we are mostly likely
to classify accurately. The fact that naive bayes and glr perform substantially worse
with respect to FPR further motivates our choice to use random forest in ghost&rae.
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To summarize, ghost&rae has high true positive detections nearly immediately, but
if an organization can afford to wait four months to let RRs age the classification
results will contain fewer false positives.
Malware Related to High Confidence APT Clusters In general, APT threats
only need a remote access tool (RAT) to achieve their malicious ends. APTs are
primarily focused on extracting information, and RATs allow this to happen remotely.
As such, we commonly see APT threats making use of common off-the-shelf malware.
For the top 50 clusters generated by ghost&rae that began in November 2013, we
present the Anti-Virus labels of malware known to query these domain names in
Table 17. If the labels largely indicate RATs and trojans, it gives further evidence that
these are in fact APT-related beyond the APT Modeling Module confidence scores.
However, if we see a predominance of non-generic malware families (Zeus, Bobax,
ZeroAccess, Virut, etc.) the infrastructure likely represents commodity malicious
infrastructure.
We see a predominance of generic classifications for the AV labels that contacted
domains in our likely APT clusters, the bulk of which are trojans or backdoors.
Since APT operators are known to use such common tools, sometimes with slight
modifications, these are the AV labels one would expect to be assigned to malware
used in APT threats. Poison Ivy occurs relatively frequently and is a popular RAT
kit used by APT operators [104]. The final two families are generic AV detections for
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families of network-spreading malware. While this makes sense as well from the APT
standpoint, we are investigating these clusters further to see the relationship and
use of these families in APT threats. The remaining labels are frequently heuristic
detections and other generic labels.
6.4.1.1 Manual Labeling Comparison
We can compare the gains provided by ghost&rae, compared to manual labeling, in
two ways: time and accuracy. In the context of time, we can estimate how long it
would have likely taken to label all the domains that were detected by ghost&rae.
With respect to accuracy, we can identify the differences between false negatives and
false positives of the two detection “systems.”
Industry reports suggest that, given the number of alerts an organization receives,
security analysts have seven minutes to investigate the validity of an alert [8]. If
these events were given back-to-back to a security organization without any other
alerts in between, it would take roughly 52 days to achieve the same ground truth
gains ghost&rae was able to do in fewer than five hours.
As far as accuracy is concerned, ghost&rae increased the ground truth coverage
by 408% from the manually labeled entries. This means manual labeling incurred an
additional 10,716 false negatives compared to ghost&rae. This is to be expected as
an automated system can cover more ground than human analysts. However, this
naturally comes with an increased likelihood of false positives. Using our best model
during evaluation, ghost&rae had 462 additional false positives compared to zero
from the manual labeling process. If the above investigation statistic still holds, this
could cost an organization 2.25 days of investigation but at the gain of many more
missed detections and days of analysts’ time saved.
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6.4.2 Unsupervised Phase Evaluation
The unsupervised phase of ghost&rae is focused on providing actionable clusters
to network operators to expand their understanding of APT threats and iteratively
improve the APT Knowledge Base. In turn, this increases the overall accuracy of the
system. We model all of IPv4 using ghost&rae. To illustrate its effectiveness, we
explain how the system was used to improve the size of our APT Knowledge Base
while in operational use. We show that network operators confirm it successfully
detects APT campaigns.
In total, we classified and clustered approximately 302 million resource records,
yielding roughly 1.1 million clusters. A distribution of the average APT score of
the clusters is shown in Figure 24. While we have many clusters, a tiny proportion
have high chances of being APT related and should be investigated. Of the original
1.1 million clusters, 37,164 have a score ≥ 0.5, 724 have a score ≥ 0.8 and only 60
have a score ≥ 0.9. Manual analysis is time consuming, but there are very few high
likelihood clusters operators must investigate even when modeling the entire internet.
Examining the relationship between cluster sizes and their average APT confidence
shows that high confidence clusters tend to be small and thus easier to manually
verify (see Figure 25). We present some example clusters in Section 6.5. In general,
the reader will observe that they are small, the domains are highly related, and there
is rarely confusion between the operators if the clusters are at least partially known
internally.
We ran ghost&rae through the entire process illustrated in Figure 18 for a period
of three month. Using the final output from Figure 18 (7), we manually inspected
the generated clusters in the order described in Section 6.3.3.2 to iteratively improve
our understanding of APT threats. Our initial APT Knowledge Base consisted of
only 2,831 domain name zones known to facilitate APT infrastructure. In only three











Figure 24: Distribution of average APT confidences from unsupervised evaluation of
all IPv4. Most clusters are highly unlikely to be APT.
the 11,549 known labeled APT zones through confirmation by third party industry
reports or by drawing conclusive relationships between the infrastructure, i.e., the
APT threats shared E2LD domain names, hosting infrastructure with known APTs,
and/or had identical WHOIS information. In addition to increasing our ground truth
coverage of APT threats using the IPv4 experiment, we also identify additional in-
frastructure for known threats, threats that have continued to function in spite of
previous reports, and discover a previously unknown APT threat. We detail these
case studies in Section 6.5.
6.5 Case Studies
In this section, we discuss three case studies of APT infrastructure ghost&rae iden-
tified during our IPv4 experiment. In many cases, we found additional infrastructure
for known APT threats, or show that previously thought inactive APT threats con-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 25: Number of qnames in a cluster (log-scale) vs. average APT confidence for
all of IPv4.
the best of our knowledge one new APT threat that originates in China and targets
nearby East Asian countries.
6.5.1 Mutter/Beebus
Our first case study confirms an earlier finding by FireEye when they reverse engi-
neered the Mutter backdoor and using the C&C infrastructure identified it as being
related to Operation Beebus [78, 179]. We independently identified this APT infras-
tructure (see Table 18) without reverse-engineering malware and found that despite
being found over a year ago, the C&C infrastructure is still active as of November 10,
2014 and resolves to 114.52.1.21 an IP address in South Korea’s SK Telecom. The
link between our identified infrastructure and that discovered by FireEye was the
email used to register the domains: binalakshminp@yahoo.com. Registration emails
used in WHOIS tend to be strong indicators of relatedness in the event domain’s
WHOIS is not privacy protected. There are an additional 51 domain names under
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the dsmtp[dot]com zone that resolved through 2014, but are no longer active.
6.5.2 Sinon Campaign
Our second case study used some of the same infrastructure as Operation Beebus,
but instead targeted research laboratories in India, specifically, India’s Defense Met-
allurgical Research Laboratory and Defense Research and Development Organization.
While ghost&rae discovered this attack in mid-2014, it has since been discovered and
confirmed by 3rd party sources with additional information about the infection vec-
tor [34]. The attack was distributed by a spear-phishing email that took advantage
of CVE-2012-0158. The domains we identified are shown in Table 19. Once again the
domains include innocuous child labels, e.g., gov and support, in an attempt to not
raise any red flags given the network being targeted.
6.5.3 Domain Name Family Campaigns
Our third case study identifies additional, previously undisclosed infrastructure ex-
plained in the extended clustering report [67] of Hardy et. al.’s recent work in char-
acterizing politically motivated APT threats [68]. These campaigns targeted four
groups, one in China and three in Tibet, focused on human rights issues in China
and human rights issues in Tibet, respectively. The authors state they only observed
the attacks from November 2010 to March 4, 2013.
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Using ghost&rae we were able to identify more infrastructure than reported in [68,
67], but also discovered that the attack is still active. In addition to the infrastructure
shown in Table 20 there are 25 additional domain names that are actively resolving
as of July 15, 2015 to IPs in China, Malaysia, Azerbaijan, the United States, South
Korea, and Germany.
6.5.4 New APT Threat—Espionage
Our final example is to the best of our knowledge a new APT campaign or campaigns
that has not been fully discovered before. While we have no conclusive evidence, much
of the circumstantial evidence points to it being one or more politically motivated
APT threats targeting countries in East Asia and likely perpetrated by China. The
domain names contained within the cluster are shown in Table 21. All but one
(msgkmg.com) of the domains appear to be affiliated with the campaigns — as a
benign website that shares hosting with APT campaigns.
The three main indicators are the domain names themselves, malware evidence
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found in relation to these domain names, and baiting techniques that suggest political
motivations. First, nearly all of the domain names use popular Chinese Dynamic
DNS providers and use third level labels for organization or deception purposes (see
bold in Table 21). Specifically, domain names like office-update.eicp[dot]net
are meant to look innocuous as though they are updates to Microsoft Word and
domains such as thudohanoi.gnway[dot]net, timesofindia.oicp[dot]net, and
yangontrip[dot]com are suggestions on the intended target. In all, the domain
names “call out” the countries, or cities in the countries, of India, Vietnam, Myanmar,
the Philippines. Also alluded to in the domain names are a Vietnamese university,
news agency, and shopping network. 58 of the domain names still actively resolve as of
November 11, 2014 and are located on IP addresses in South Korea (17), Hong Kong
(11), Mainland China (10), the United States (9), Mexico (7) Taiwan (1), Tunisia
(1), Germany (1), and Belgium (1).
Second, there are numerous reports of generic trojans communicating with this
infrastructure, which one would expect in an APT attack centered around reconnais-
sance. Numerous [44, 149, 93, 79, 159, 160, 156, 158, 157] industry reports link por-
tions of the infrastructure ghost&rae automatically identified with generic malware
known to include commands such as “capturing screen, audio and webcam, logging
keystrokes, managing passwords, and acting as a relay server” [79]. One industry
report [44] even suggested it was potentially an APT threat, but did not provide
sufficient evidence to support this claim. Given the multiple malware families shown
to communicate with this infrastructure, it is possible this infrastructure supports
multiple campaigns.
Third, one industry report [93] identified a PDF used to initiate the infection
titled “Letter to President Obama regarding His Planned Visit to Burma” (see Fig-
ure 26). The document is purported to be “from Aung Ding, Executive Director of
U.S. Campaign for Burma and dated by November 7, 2012.” While the authors of
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Figure 26: Spear-phishing PDF for Espionage Threat
the report make no suggestion of this being an APT, together with the other evidence
presented above we conclude ghost&rae has discovered a new politically-motivated
APT campaign. We encourage the security community, especially those interested
in politically-motivated attacks, to further investigate these domain names to better
understand the motives and actions of its perpetrators.
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Botnet infrastructure is constantly on the move to evade detection and takedown. As
techniques described in this dissertation become public, the natural question to ask is
if, and how can, attackers evade such techniques? First, we discuss each component
of the overall system with respect to potential avenues of evasion and the drawbacks
it entails for clever attackers. Second, we discuss, in the event a botnet successfully
evades a takedown initiated by our system, how much time it would take to reevaluate
the new infrastructure for an additional takedown action. We show that we can likely
keep up with migrating attackers due to the automation improvements the systems
in this dissertation provides.
7.1 Evasion
7.1.1 Evading Infrastructure Enumeration
Malware-level Attackers are always attempting to evade newly created defenses.
The most obvious ways to evade gza are through timing attacks, peer-to-peer valida-
tion of network resource connectivity, communicating with different protocols, or by
evading dynamic analysis entirely with excessive timeouts prior to performing mali-
cious behavior. We discuss these evasion techniques and present methods to address
these shortcomings. Since our games use RFC-compliant network responses, malware
is unable to determine if it is being gamed at the host-level and subsequently must
use the network in clever ways to determine its execution environment.
Dynamic malware analysis systems generally execute malware for a fixed period
of time, usually around five minutes per sample. Malware can remain dormant until
this time passes to evade detection and analysis. Prior work addresses this limitation
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by finding these trigger-based behaviors and generating inputs to satisfy the triggers
at runtime. This limitation applies to all dynamic analysis systems in general and is
orthogonal to the problem we are trying to solve of increasing the network information
an executing sample attempts to connect to.
Overhead incurred during usermode packet generation could enable a clever mal-
ware author to determine if they are being gamed or not. As a performance improve-
ment, gza will only route packets relevant to the game in question. For example,
when Gdnsw is being played, iptables will only route UDP packets with a port of 53
destined for a VM. If DNS packets take abnormally long, while packets of other types
are unaffected this could alert a malware sample that it is being analyzed. Simply
routing all packets through its game would apply this overhead uniformly across all
packets, removing the signal.
Peer-to-peer (P2P) evasion is when a malware sample verifies the results of a
DNS or TCP request by asking another infected machine to perform an identical
request. If a sample, m, cannot resolve a domain name d, but fellow infected hosts
can resolve d successfully, m has reason to believe it is being run under our system.
Communicating this information, however, requires the network. This forces m to
succumb to gameplay one way or another; gaming of its initial C&C communication
or gaming of verification queries to its peers. By focusing on the building blocks of
network communication, we force all network activity to be gamed.
To perform a DNS query, a malware sample could query an HTTP-based DNS
tool1, bypassing the DNS protocol entirely. Furthermore, it could directly connect to
a C&C using a non-gamed protocol, such as UDP. These problems are easily addressed
by running aggregate games and adding additional protocols. Querying an HTTP-
based DNS lookup tool still requires some network activity so running DNS and TCP
games simultaneously would prevent this lookup from succeeding. If an attacker uses
1http://www.kloth.net/services/nslookup.php
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another protocol, such as UDP, it is easy to write a new game that targets this new
behavior. As malware adapts to the presence of network games, malware analysts
can keep pace with malware authors without too much effort.
Network-level Internet miscreants are faced with two posibilities to evade network
infrastructure enumeration as described in Chapter 4: inject noise into the passive
DNS or forgo the DNS entirely.
If a botnet uses the DNS to reach its command and control server, the domain
name must resolve in order for malware to perform its malicious activities. Changing
the resolved IP address for a domain name used by malware could inject noise, but
at the cost of preventing all malware from communicating with the C&C during
that period of time. In most cases, this would prevent successful monetization of
the botnet and would be unlikely to be done by the malware authors. Alternatively,
malware authors could spoof resolutions to C&C domains with incorrect A records,
since DNS is based on UDP and is stateless and not authenticated. If the queries were
performed in one of the networks where passive DNS data are collected, these spurious
relationships could affect our systems. Faking resolutions to benign domains would
be handled by our aggressive whitelisting (Section 4.1.2.1) or by detecting collateral
damage (Chapter 6). Futhermore, attackers would need to be heavily distributed in
their spoofing attempts to avoid being trivially detectable.
C&C communication does not require the use of the DNS, but it does provide
numerous benefits: the DNS is cheap (or free), effective, and is expected by many
malware kits. Peer-to-peer (P2P) C&C schemes could be used, but are more difficult
to set up and maintain, and can often be too noisy for certain kinds of malicious
activity (see Section 7.1.2). Direct IP connections could also be used, but at the
detrimental cost of reduced agility. Simply blocking the IP addresses used for C&C by
a botnet would be sufficient to permanently sever the connection between botmaster
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and their infected clients.
7.1.2 Evading APT Infrastructure Detection
The two primary drawbacks to the technique for detecting APTs as described in
Chapter 6 are feature evasion and using C&C servers that do not rely on the DNS
to bootstrap their connections. With respect to the first, we believe our features are
robust enough that evasion would be detrimental to the attack (see Table 22). For the
second, non-DNS C&C are either brittle or very noisy, both of which are undesirable
qualities in an APT campaign.
Feature Robustness While the features used in ghost&rae could be altered by
APT actors, we argue in most cases it would open up their infrastructure to detection
by more traditional detection systems and may leave a convincing attribution trail
that could lead to legal and geopolitical consequences. We believe these potential
ramifications are sufficient to prevent substantial evasion from our current modeling.
For example, the On/Off domain name behavior’s primary purpose is to “lie low”
in sensitive networks, and while malicious software can function without this it is
likely to draw unwanted attention to APT infections. The use of compromised ma-
chines could be replaced with more traditional paid-for hosting infrastructure, but
this introduces a money trail, which would aid law enforcement when hunting down
the perpetrators. Switching away from compromised hosting could also lessen the
usefulness of the infrastructure distribution features, but at the cost of having cen-
tralized points of failure for the APT campaign. Client lookup distribution features
are unlikely to change, as APT threats are targeted by definition. Clever attackers
could inject binaries into non-targeted networks to alter these features, but this would
substantially raise their profile and potentially lead to earlier detection. In summary,
while APT actors could attempt to evade the features, it opens the risk of even earlier
detection and seriously damaging geopolitical consequences if successful attribution
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were performed.
Non-DNS C&Cs ghost&rae detects DNS-based APT infrastructure, but APT
actors may use other means, such as directly connecting to hosts by IP [65], or by
using a peer-to-peer (P2P) based C&C scheme [143]. In the former case, APT actors
lose tremendous agility without the DNS at their disposal. Furthermore, in instances
where the hosting infrastructure uses compromised machines as stepping stones, use
of domain names is arguably necessary since these machines may become unavail-
able at any moment. The use of the DNS buys tremendous agility at little to no
cost. For the latter case, P2P C&C schemes have become popular in traditional bot-
net C&Cs, likely due to their increased robustness against comprehensive takedown.
However, P2P schemes often require regular communication to maintain the state of
the overlay network, which introduces substantial noise. For example, the popular
ZeroAccess [143] malware uses a P2P C&C channel and the initial list of peers is
contained within the binary. After connecting to one of the initial peers, it updates
its view of the network to maintain its connection. If the binary’s initial list of peers
are no longer active, the binary can no longer connect to the P2P network. This is
unlikely to work well in the APT case where connections are infrequent.
7.2 Chasing Agile Attackers
While each component of the system is resilient to evasion, it would be foolhardy to
assume clever and agile attackers will never be able to avoid a successful takedown
we initiate. The primary benefit of the system in this dissertation is automation;
condensing the largely manual process to perform a takedown before can now be
done primarily automatically.
To show the benefit of such a system even against clever attackers, we show the
expected running time from start to finish in Equation 6. We show that the running
time is short enough that pace can be kept with evading attackers. We show the time
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Table 22: Summary of modeling feature evasion consequences and the relative out-
of-bag feature family importance (larger is better; see [96, 20] for details) (top) and
evading the DNS (bottom). To summarize, most of the features contribute equi-
tably to detection and removing any one of them is unlikely to completely negate
ghost&rae’s effectiveness.
Feature Evasion Consequence Importance
Stop On/Off Noisier at the network’s edge 227.97
Reduce Infrastructure Distribution Reduces plausible deniability;
increases ease of attribution
172.92
Increase Client Lookup Distribution Noisier at global level; de-
tectable by traditional detec-
tors
229.98
Stop using DynDNS/E2LD children Increase financial cost 160.92
Fewer bogon resolutions Noisier (like Stop On/Off) 75.27
DNS Evasion Consequence
Direct IP connections (no DNS) Greatly reduces agility; suspi-
cious
P2P-based C&C (no DNS) Greatly increases noise;
already targeted in enter-
prise/government networks;
likely requires non-targeted
infections for overlay network
it took to perform the postmortem takedowns described in Chapter 5.2 as well as the
takedown recommendations described in Chapter 5.3. In each case, the running time
is sufficiently short that attackers will not have substantial time to continue evading
a takedown, which will likely be successful in the long run.
The total running time for performing a full takedown postmortem or a takedown
recommendation analysis is T as defined by:
T = TIE + TMI + TG (6)
where TMI is the time to perform malware interrogation on the botnet, TIE is the
time it takes to perform infrastructure enumeration, and TG is the running time for
modeling and clustering the infrastructure to detect likely collateral damage in the
form of APT infrastructure. Each sub-equation is defined below:
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TIE = 2αP (7)
Equation 7 represents the time to fully enumerate the infrastructure of a botnet’s
criminal network. P represents the time to perform a full pass of the passive DNS
database to identify related infrastructure and α represents the number passes that
must be performed until the infrastructure converges. Two passes over the passive
DNS database must be made in order to enumerate infrastructure (see Figure 6); once
to identify related historic IP addresses and a second time to identify related historic
domain names. Recall Figure 14 that shows the process to perform a takedown
recommendation. If additional infrastructure is identified through malware interro-
gation, an additional pass over the passive DNS is needed to continue to expand our
knowledge of the infrastructure.
Performing a pass over the passive DNS database can be done with either bulk or
individual requests. In a bulk request, the running time is O(1) with respect to the
number of domains but a single bulk request runs on the order of minutes, while with
individual requests the running time is O(n) in the number of domain names that
must be queried but a single request finishes in seconds. For ease of presentation,
we only consider bulk requests but in an operational environment individual requests
would be made where time would be saved. As we show, however, most infrastructure





Equation 8 is the time to fully interrogate the malware of the botnet to extract any
additional network endpoints that must be disabled, as well as any potential backup
C&C behavior included in the botnet’s infrastructure. This is limited by the number
of machines we have available for performing malware analysis, M, the duration of
the control malware analysis run, t, and the number of malware samples related to
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the botnet’s infrastructure m. Recall that each malware sample must be run five
times, two of which for duration 2t, in order to understand the malware’s backup
plan (see Chapter 3.3.3).
TG = P +G+R (9)
Equation 9 represents the time to extract features from, classify, and cluster the
domain names currently being considered for a takedown as being APT-related or
not. Recall that APT domains often use compromised machines for C&C servers
so such takedowns are likely to include benign domains if network operators are not
diligent. The APT modeling features as described in Chapter 6.3.2.1 require passive
DNS evidence that also take time P as described above. To generate the features,
only a single pass over the passive DNS data is required. The remaining time is to
perform the modeling as described in Chapter 6.3.2.2, G, and to generate clusters
as described in Chapter 6.3.3.1, R. As the running times G and R are difficult to
quantify reliably in terms of the input size, we simply provide an upper bound for
each when modeling and clustering one million resource records.
Bound and Free Variables Throughout the evaluation of the systems, the fol-
lowing variables were bound:
• M = 512 virtual machines for malware interrogation.
• t = 3 minutes for the control malware execution timeout. Note malware may
terminate earlier of its own accord, but malware will run for at most three
minutes.
• G = 30 minutes to perform modeling on one million resource record feature
vectors.
• R = 240 minutes to cluster one million classified resource records.
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Table 23: Timings for end-to-end run of postmortem studies.
Takedown α m T (in hours)
Kelihos 1 199 5.68
Zeus 1 2,428 7.20
Nitol 1 12,745 14.25
• P = 21 minutes to make a single, full pass over the passive DNS database.
This leaves two free variables to compute for each postmortem or takedown recom-
mendation: α and m the number of runs of the system until convergence is achieved
and the number of malware samples to be analyzed, respectively.
7.2.1 Postmortem Running Time
We revisit the takedown postmortems presented in Chapter 5.2 for three botnet take-
downs: Kelihos, Zeus, and Nitol (3322.org). The timing information is summarized
in Table 23
7.2.2 Takedown Recommendation Running Time
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Table 24: Timings for end-to-end run for takedown recommendations.
ID α m T (in hours)
1 1 6,431 9.93
2 1 24,212 22.10
3 1 43 5.57
4 1 1 5.55
5 1 59 5.58
6 1 344 5.78
7 1 999 6.22
8 1 94,248 69.97
9 1 2 5.55
10 1 810 6.10
11 1 3 5.55
12 1 75 5.60
13 1 220 5.70
14 1 92 5.60
15 1 129,431 94.02
16 1 4,978 8.95
17 1 1 5.55
18 1 71 5.58
19 1 1,325 6.45
20 1 3,305 7.80
21 1 4,421 8.57
22 1 323 5.77
23 1 1 5.55
24 1 552 5.92
25 1 596 5.95
26 1 7,311 10.53
27 1 303 5.75
28 1 33 5.57
29 1 5,517 9.32
30 1 91,355 67.98
31 1 238 5.70
32 1 34 5.57
33 1 87 5.60
34 1 42 5.57
35 1 8 5.55
36 1 180 5.67
37 1 59,062 45.92
38 1 3,391 7.87
39 1 502 5.88
40 1 53 5.58
41 1 34,062 28.83
42 1 148 5.65
43 1 1,021 6.23
44 1 52 5.58
45 1 15 5.55




8.1 Overall Contributions and Summary
To automatically enumerate infrastructure in preparation for a takedown three tasks
must be performed: malware-based infrastructure enumeration, network-based infras-
tructure enumeration, and to identify potential collateral damage. Using the output
from these tasks, we evaluate the success of historic takedowns and recommend ac-
tions for a future takedown.
Malware Infrastructure Enumeration We built and evaluated gza, which inter-
rogates malware to reveal alternative execution plans of malware and classify instances
where the backup behavior is more elaborate, e.g., DGA- or P2P-based C&C scheme.
gza can coerce hundreds of thousands of likely malicious domain names from mal-
ware that never appeared on public blacklists after our study and that sophisticated
backup C&C techniques, such as DGA or P2P, can be reliably detected by playing
games with malware. Both are necessary to perform a successful takedown.
gza is available as open-source software 1 as a module to the popular malware
analysis framework “Cuckoo Sandbox.”
Network Infrastructure Enumeration We built deck to enumerate malicious
infrastructure based on an initial set of seed domains, i.e., initial knowledge of a set
of infrastructure, by analyzing the passive DNS history of the seed domains. deck
builds and visualizes graph representations of malicious infrastructure and analyzes
them with respect to performing comprehensive takedowns using network analysis
1https://github.com/ynadji/cuckoo/tree/gza
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measures. We found that in many cases criminal networks can be disabled by de-
registering as few as five domain names. In more sophisticated networks, targeting
the C&C servers themselves can cause substantial damage to the infrastructure. In
one case, disabling 20% of a criminal network’s hosts would reduce the overall volume
of successful connections by 70%, suggesting that certain “critical” nodes are more
important to the infrastructure.
deck’s visualization of criminal networks has been implemented into the product
offering of Damballa, Inc.
Measuring & Recommending Takedowns We built rza—a combination of gza
and deck—to measure the success of historic takedowns and use a similar method-
ology to recommend how to perform a takedown and what precautionary measures
must be taken to ensure the takedown is successful. We find that several historic
takedowns were performed without fully enumerating the criminal infrastructure, al-
lowing malicious activity to continue unfettered. We also show many threats active
at the time of the study can be disabled easily by only “sinkholing” or disabling a
handful of domain names. Finally, many of the studied takedowns caused serious
collateral damage to legitimate customers; this motivates the need to build tools to
identify network assets likely shared between benign users and Internet miscreants to
ensure a takedown action does not cause undue harm.
The output of rza for several botnets has been given to the FBI to inform on
the backup behavior of malware and the feasibility of taking down their criminal
infrastructure.
Collateral Damage—Advanced Threats We presented ghost&rae, a system to
model “manual APT” infrastructure that commonly resides on compromised hosts
alongside benign domains. After classifying these domains, we cluster them to sepa-
rate malicious APT domains from benign domains to prevent them from being taken
118
down and disabled as collateral damage. We show that ghost&rae can model APT
domains with high true positive and low false positive rates. While this is only one
class of collateral damage to detect, it represents an interesting case as it is a common
source of false positives for existing reputation systems [4, 14].
ghost&rae is currently being tested for production deployment at Damballa, Inc.
8.2 Lessons Learned
Throughout the process of writing the dissertation, we have identified some key lessons
learned with respect to botnet takedowns and APT infrastructure.
8.2.1 Botnet Takedowns
Botnets have prevailed despite concerted efforts to both clean infected machines as
well as disable the C&C infrastructure. This is partially due to the lack of auto-
mated enumeration techniques as discussed and tackled in detail in this dissertation.
However, there are other pitfalls the security community must be cautious of when
performing takedowns.
We have shown that many real-world botnets can be disabled by revoking or
sinkholing fewer than dozens of domain names. These botnets are typically much
smaller than those targeted in high-profile takedown cases, but nonetheless they can
be disabled easily. However, even in successful takedowns, such as Kelihos 5.2.2,
we see that the botnets do not always go away forever. While the first variant of
Kelihos was successfully disabled, the perpetrators were not initially arrested and a
new variant quickly began to spread.
This begs the question: is a takedown that leaves the botmasters free to infect
another day beneficial for the security community? On one hand, it puts a tempo-
rary stop to profits from cybercrime, but on the other hand it forces attackers to
build more resilient infrastructure. Further study is needed to quantify this cost,
and more importantly, perform attribution to assist law enforcement in arresting the
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botmasters.
Finally, sophisticated C&C infrastructure, such as DGA/P2P-based schemes, must
be handled appropriately to ensure a successful takedown. In the case of DGAs, care-
fully reversing the DGA and working with the registrars as appropriate is necessary
to successfully perform a takedown. The case of P2P is harder still; while prior
work [142] describes techniques to disable these botnets, one has yet to be disabled.
The main conclusion to be drawn is if the security community does not have a plan
of action to handle sophisticated C&C infrastructure, it is better to not attempt a
takedown at all.
8.2.2 Manual APT Infrastructure
While studying manual APT infrastructure that was identified by ghost&rae, we
identified some key takeaways and avenues for further research surrounding APTs.
First, malware is not a strong indicator of APT threats. Second, the features described
in Chapter 6 are likely robust since they describe measurable properties of APT
attacks. Finally, a taxonomy of APT attacks is needed to further understand how
detection and remediation of these threats can be performed in a more general manner.
While some APT threats use “advanced” malware, most APTs use commodity
malware. This is corroborated by the industry reports on APTs we studied, as well as
our findings in Section 6.4, where the highest confidence APT-related infrastructure
ghost&rae identified were used by generic trojans. This suggests that not only is the
‘A’ in APT incorrect, additional work on detecting these threats should move away
from focusing on the malware samples currently in use by attackers.
Choosing robust features is paramount to building a successful machine learning
model. Not only are the features we designed robust in practice (see Section 7.1.2),
but the intuition for them are based on measurable properties of APT attacks, e.g.,
they are targeted and persistent, rather than properties surrounding the intent of the
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attack, e.g., stealing intellectual property, or properties that are difficult to reliably
detect, e.g., perpetrated by a nation-state.
While ghost&rae provides a good starting point for detection, building a taxon-
omy of APTs seen in the wild would further improve the state-of-the-art. The as-
sumptions made for “manual” APTs are likely not true for all APTs, but this cannot
be known unless a comprehensive taxonomy is created. This would not only improve
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